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Abstract
This paper analyzes humanitarian assistance to complex humanitarian emergencies to
understand why suboptimal outcomes result even when humanitarians have ethical
principles and good intentions. It focuses on the International Committee of the Red
Cross, the United Nations, and Médecins Sans Frontières to understand their core
principles before looking at how these principles operationalize during emergencies.
Challenges arise due to complex relationships with donors, local actors, and recipients,
along with issues of marketization and competition. This paper’s case studies of the postgenocide Rwandan refugee crisis and post-9/11 Afghanistan explore how humanitarian
principles clash with such dilemmas. In the end, humanitarian organizations are often
unable to adhere to principles in the midst of crises and make compromises of
competition and complicity that lead to suboptimal outcomes for the people they are
trying to help. Looking to modern emergencies in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan, it is
critical to understand these dynamics and seek to improve institutions of humanitarian aid
to make assistance actually beneficial for those in need.
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Introduction
In 2017, the United Nations (UN) is warning that the largest global
humanitarian crisis since 1945 is rapidly approaching. UN humanitarian chief
Stephen O’Brien recently declared that “we stand at a critical point in history,” as
the international community determines how to address famines in Yemen,
Somalia, South Sudan, and Nigeria, and ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq.1
However, it is unclear whether the next moment will be the world’s humanitarian
triumph or deep failure. What sort of outcomes should we expect from
humanitarian assistance to these crises? How should we understand the dynamics
of the humanitarian aid sector? Does aid do more harm than good?
Aid agencies are positioned as moral, neutral entities that send life-saving
assistance around the globe. Yet, critics of humanitarian assistance are
increasingly common and outspoken, as aid has become scapegoat for the
challenges of addressing crises abroad. Such critiques focus on aspects like
overreach of aid organizations, naivety of political context, and neo-imperialism.
This paper is another critique of the aid sector, seeking to understand the
institutional factors that constrain humanitarians and how humanitarian actors
respond to them. Can humanitarian principles resist influences that coopt and
constrict? Should they? Although humanitarian aid actors are typically considered
ethical, neutral bodies, there are many cases where actors compromise their
principles. Often humanitarians are locked in counterproductive competition, as
1

"UN: World Facing Greatest Humanitarian Crisis since 1945." 2017.BBC News, March
11, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39238808.
1

the aid sector does not behave like a free market and humanitarians face
challenges to their fundamental beliefs, service delivery, and even survival. In the
face of such challenges, humanitarian organizations are unable to fully adhere to
their best practices and make compromises or set bad examples that ultimately
lead to suboptimal outcomes for the communities they are attempting to help.

Scope
This paper is an analysis of emergency humanitarian assistance in
complex emergencies. As defined by the UN, complex humanitarian emergencies
(CHEs) are “deep social crises in which large numbers of people die from war,
displacement, disease, and hunger, owing to man-made disasters...”2 Such
emergencies are often multidimensional and involve various forms of suffering. It
is also important to note that complex humanitarian emergencies are man-made,
making them both political and politicized crises, although a natural disaster may
trigger or complicate such a situation.
There are four main components of a complex humanitarian emergency.
Warfare involves population dislocation, disruption of economic/political
institutions, and loss of life thus increasing a country’s vulnerability.
Displacement involves ethnic cleansing, internal movement, repression, and
international migration. Diseases vary across the world with intensity and ability
to treat and often have high child mortality rates. Hunger afflicts many parts of
2

Klugman, Jeni. 1999. Social and economic policies to prevent complex humanitarian
emergencies: Lessons from experience. Helsinki, Finland: The United Nations
University.
2

the developing world, but famines often result from human intervention involving
disruption of food supplies, interruption of transportation, or manipulation of
markets. When all four issues are present in a complex humanitarian emergency,
it is classified as “acute,” or the most severe.3 Complex humanitarian emergencies
have many causes, especially political and economic factors: group mobilization,
inequality, absence of attractive sources of income, issues of state legitimacy,
state-sponsored violence, lack of institutions, worsening economic conditions,
external shocks (change in terms of trade, debt, change in development
assistance), and environmental degradation/reduction in resource availability.4
This paper offers two complex humanitarian emergencies as case studies
through which to understand the challenges of humanitarian assistance: postgenocide Rwanda and post-9/11 Afghanistan. Both Rwanda and Afghanistan were
categorized as “acute” complex humanitarian emergencies, meaning they
involved warfare, disease, hunger, and displacement.5 These emergencies are
useful case studies for this reason, as they allow for a broad analysis of
humanitarian aid.
This paper uses the terms humanitarian assistance and humanitarian aid
interchangeably. Humanitarian assistance is the provision of aid to people in
immediate peril during emergencies. Its main goal is keeping people alive and
alleviation of suffering.6 Such aid often involves the “provision of food, water and

3

Ibid.
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Barnett, Michael N. 2011. The Empire of Humanity a History of Humanitarianism.
Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press.
4
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sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for
the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives,” as
defined by an initiative on humanitarianism of the European Commission, the
ICRC, OECD, various NGOs, and academic representation.7 Humanitarian aid
directly contrasts development assistance, or alchemical humanitarianism as
termed by Michael Barnett.8 Development assistance attempts to address root
causes and systemic problems, focused on economic, social, and political work.
Development aid is often long-term and not in direct response to a specific
emergency. Development assistance is set aside for the purposes of this paper.
Humanitarian assistance, for its part, is often based on humanitarian principles,
but these are not monolithic and differ between organizations.
The system of international humanitarianism involves a multitude of
actors that finance, plan, coordinate, and deliver assistance. These actors include
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations (UN), hybrid
groups like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), nongovernment organizations (NGOs) like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF),
government institutions, and philanthropic foundations. NGOs are private nonprofit groups set up by individuals with a common interest, often organized
around a specific issue or provision of a certain service. NGOs can be regional,
national, or international and are not founded by a state. In contrast, IGOs are
created by a treaty, involving more than one nation, to work on an issue of
7

"23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship." Good Humanitarian
Donorship., http://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-ofghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html.
8
2011.
4

common interest. Often IGOs have special agencies or organs to fulfill specific
functions, along with rules and rights/duties of members.
This paper utilizes three archetypal organizations for detailed analysis.
These organizations are the ICRC, the UN, and MSF. Each of these organizations
represents a certain type of humanitarian actor and has influence within the
humanitarian system. The UN is one of the oldest and largest IGOs, with a major
humanitarian role. MSF is an international, independent medical humanitarian
organization and notably present/outspoken in many complex emergencies. The
ICRC is a hybrid organization, neither an IGO nor an NGO, but an important and
foundational humanitarian actor. The ICRC is a private association formed under
Swiss Civil Code, but a government does not mandate its existence.9 Its functions
are mandated by international law, the Geneva Conventions, and as a result, it
enjoys certain privileges (exemption from taxes, inviolability of premises, judicial
immunity) that IGOs do.
This paper’s overall lens is humanitarian assistance provided to complex
humanitarian emergencies, specifically by the ICRC, UN, and MSF. By
examining these actors’ efforts and the challenges they face, it is possible to
understand some key dynamics within the humanitarian sector, including
politicization and marketization. Politicization is the process of making
humanitarian aid political, through either deliberate action or as a consequence of
entanglement with political actors. Marketization is the exposure of a sector to
market forces that makes entities act in increasingly competitive ways. Looking at
9

Rona, Gabor. "The ICRC's Status: In a Class of its Own." ICRC., last modified
February 17, 2004 https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm.
5

the actions of the ICRC, UN, and MSF in the complex emergencies in Rwanda
and Afghanistan allows for examination of these institutional forces in the
humanitarian sector.

Overview
Chapter I is an in-depth comparison of the ICRC, MSF, and UN in terms
of organization history, values, funders, and priorities. It provides organizational
context to understand the values and operational frameworks of each entity that
will be drawn upon throughout the case studies that follow.
Chapter II explains and analyzes the various challenges and institutional
constraints of the humanitarian sector. It first describes humanitarians’
relationships with donors, local governments, and aid recipients and the
institutions that govern them. Next, it explains the phenomenon of marketization
in humanitarian aid. Finally, it offers an analysis of institutional factors that create
challenges of coordination and competition in the provision of humanitarian
assistance.
Chapter III provides context for the first case study, that of the postRwandan Genocide refugee crisis. It contains a brief history of Rwanda and
details the reputations of humanitarian actors in the region. Chapter IV, the first
case study, argues that the Rwandan refugee crisis was a situation where
humanitarians neglected political factors, which led to donor manipulation of
goals and a use of humanitarian aid instead of desperately needed security
intervention. The chapter first explains the organizational goals of the ICRC, UN,
6

and MSF going into the crisis before outlining the various crisis-specific
challenges. It then recounts the three organizations’ responses to such challenges
before finally analyzing these actions for what they represent about humanitarians
facing sector difficulties broadly.
The subsequent chapters are an additional case study, following a similar
organization. Chapter V offers a brief explanation of the conflict in Afghanistan
since 1979 and characterizes the reputation of humanitarianism in country.
Chapter VI, the case study of the post-9/11 emergency in Afghanistan, argues that
humanitarian assistance was coopted by military and political goals. Ethical
principles were largely unable to prevent this. This chapter uses the same
organization as Chapter IV, going through the organizations’ goals before the
challenges, their responses, and a final contextualizing analysis.
The Conclusion summarizes the challenges that humanitarian agencies
face when responding to complex humanitarian emergencies and how such
challenges clash with humanitarian principles. Finally, this paper offers brief
implications for the urgent humanitarian crises of 2017, in particular those in
Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan.

7

Chapter I: Organization Comparisons
Introduction
Humanitarian organizations react to challenges based on their principles
and relative power. As it is impossible to understand the intricacies of a wide
array of humanitarian actors and their responses to challenges faced in emergency
relief, three organizations are used here for analysis: the ICRC, MSF, and the UN.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was a pioneer for
humanitarian assistance and most organizations base their principles on those it
promulgated. For these reasons, understanding the ICRC’s principles and actions
in complex emergencies is important. The United Nations (UN) has many
humanitarian branches and often sets the tone for humanitarian assistance to a
given emergency. For this paper, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA) will be most relevant because these agencies are present in complex
emergencies. It is important to note that the UN is an intergovernmental
organization (IGO), affected by member state interests in a way that NGOs are
not. This means the UN must be more responsive to states and may have less
room for negotiation with donors. Finally, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)
adopted many of the principles of the ICRC, yet is also known for being more
advocacy-oriented. This means it often advocates for international action
regarding complex emergencies and is notable for suspending operations when it
disagrees with political or security aspects of a situation.

8

The ICRC, UN, and MSF are powerful organizations in comparison to
many other NGO and IGOs, making it critical to analyze how they respond to
challenges of marketization and politicization, as explained in the introduction.
Since these organizations often set a standard for humanitarianism, their ability or
inability to navigate the dilemmas of humanitarianism are illuminating for
comprehending the challenges of the sector more broadly. This chapter offers a
brief history and explanation of values/mission for the three organizations to
provide context when examining their responses to the complex emergencies in
the case studies.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Troubled by the bloody aftermath of the Battle of Solferino between the
Austro-Hungarian and French empires in 1863, Henry Dunant, a Swiss
businessman, formed the ICRC to organize emergency medical assistance.10
Dunant built the organization upon Calvinist ideas and Genevan exceptionalism,
arguing for a more humane approach to war. The ICRC’s first motto was intra
armas caritas or “in war, charity,” responding to states’ lack of concern for
humanity during conflict. During the same period, figures such as Florence
Nightingale, Clara Barton, and Francis Lieber were also reacting to war’s horrors.
Nightingale argued, for example, that aid fails its duty if it is used to the

10

Forsythe, David P. 2005. The Humanitarians. publ. ed. Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge
University Press, 15.
9

advantage of any of the warring parties.11 In the Crimean War, she saw that aid
could be used to prolong war, as providing medical and food assistance helped the
armies. The founders of the ICRC rejected her views. Dunant argued that there
was a duty to help, regardless of Nightingale’s concerns. For him,
humanitarianism

was

a

“presumed

duty

to

ease

human

suffering

unconditionally.”12 This principle became entrenched in humanitarianism.
The ICRC’s principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and
independence are planted in humanitarian rhetoric. Since many aid organizations
draw on the ICRC’s definitions of humanitarianism to inform their own
principles, it is worthy defining them at length. The ICRC defines humanity as:
a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded
on the battlefield, endeavors - in its international and national
capacity - to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it
may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure
respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding,
friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.13
To fulfill this, the ICRC adheres to impartiality, understood as:
no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or
political opinions. It endeavors only to relieve suffering, giving
priority to the most urgent cases of distress.14
The ICRC also furthers the principle of neutrality, meaning:
the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or engage at
any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or
ideological nature.15
11

Polman, Linda. 2010. The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong with Humanitarian Aid?. 1st
U.S. ed. ed. New York : Metropolitan Books.
12
Polman, 7.
13
Pictet, Jean. "The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross : Commentary - ICRC.",
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/fundamental-principlescommentary-010179.htm.
14
Ibid
10

Lastly emphasizes the idea of independence to be understood as:
political, religious and economic independence….[so that]
auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their Governments and
subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always
maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act
in accordance with Red Cross principles. [for this reason] the Red
Cross must be sovereign in its decisions, acts and words: it must be
free to show the way towards humanity and justice. It is not
admissible for any power whatsoever to make it deviate from the
line established for it by its ideals.16
In 1864, the ICRC convinced governments to adopt the first Geneva
Convention to protect wounded soldiers and prevent humanitarian actors from
being targeted by belligerents.17 The ICRC first acted as a coordinator, setting up
national societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. During World War I, the
ICRC turned its attention towards prisoners of war and created a Central Prisoners
of War Agency.18 Additionally, it intervened to prevent the use of arms that
caused extreme suffering. During the interwar period, the ICRC was active as a
neutral intermediary, separate from the national movements. Additionally, it
pushed for a new Geneva Convention in 1929 to protect prisoners of war. During
World War II, the ICRC was active with relief activities and connecting the
wounded to their families.19 WWII is known as one of ICRC’s greatest failures,
because the organization did not act on behalf of Holocaust victims and many saw

15

Ibid
Ibid
17
"History of the ICRC - ICRC." ICRC., last modified October 29, 2017, accessed Apr 8,
2017, /eng/who-we-are/history/overview-section-history-icrc.htm.
18
Ibid
19
Ibid
16
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the organization’s neutrality as complicity with the Nazis.20 Since WWII, ICRC
has continually pushed for expansion of international humanitarian law (IHL) and
has provided assistance for many complex emergencies. Its influential reputation
is largely related to the Geneva Conventions and IHL, along with its impact on
promoting neutrality and impartiality in humanitarianism.21
The ICRC started the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
movement that is now a network of national societies.22 The ICRC is largely
independent of government oversight, unlike the national societies, although there
is coordination between branches. The ICRC takes the lead over emergency
response in conflict areas and directs the work of Red Cross/Red Crescent
partners.23 The ICRC has around 14,500 staff in over 80 countries and selfdescribes its current key operations as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chad, Somalia,
South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.24
The total ICRC budget for 2015 was around $1.58 billion, representing its
largest operations ever, up from $1.07 billion in 2014.25 Of that budget, the ICRC
received funding from a range of donors, the top being about $1.2 billion from
20

Gourevitch, Philip. "Alms Dealers." The New Yorker., last modified October 11 2010,
accessed Mar 8, 2017, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/11/alms-dealers.
21
"Geneva Conventions and Commentaries." International Committee of the Red Cross.,
last modified 2016-07-28, accessed Apr 8, 2017, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-andlaw/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions.
22
"The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement." International Committee
of the Red Cross., last modified 2016-08-13, accessed Apr 8, 2017,
https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/movement.
23
"What is the ICRC’s Relationship with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies?
- ICRC.", last modified 2012-11-20, accessed Apr 8, 2017,
/eng/resources/documents/faq/5fmjhl.htm.
24
"Where we Work." International Committee of the Red Cross., accessed Apr 8, 2017,
https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work.
25
ICRC Annual Report 2015. 2016. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report2015-icrc.
12

governments (83.02 percent), followed by around $123 million from the European
Commission (9.42 percent), with the rest coming from private/private sources
(4.09 percent), the Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies (3.37 percent), and
international organizations (.1 percent).26 The ICRC attempts to accept revenue
only from sources that recognize and respect the principles of independence and
impartiality of action.27 With this funding, in 2015, the ICRC provided 31.3
million people with improved access to water and sanitation, 13.3 million people
with basic aid distribution, and conducted 2.9 million health consultations.28

United Nations (UN)
The United Nations was founded in 1945 in the wake of World War II as
an international organization to secure peace and solve problems facing
humanity.29 The UN was originally formed by 51 countries, but now includes 193
member states. The UN has many functions, but its relevant goal for this paper is
“to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,” with an emphasis on the
latter.30 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
is responsible for coordinating provision of emergency relief. Four UN entities
26

Ibid
"The ICRC’s Funding and Spending." International Committee of the Red Cross., last
modified -04-11, accessed Apr 8, 2017, https://www.icrc.org/en/faq/icrcs-funding-andspending.
28
ICRC Annual Report 2015.
29
"Overview." United Nations., http://www.un.org/en/sections/aboutun/overview/index.html.
30
Guide to the United Nations Charter. Lake Success, NY: Department of Public
Information.
27
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deliver humanitarian aid: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
and the World Food Programme (WFP). The World Health Organization (WHO)
also plays a role in coordinating relief for health emergencies. This paper will
mainly discuss the activities of UNHCR and UNOCHA, with some mention of
WFP, as these entities are responsible for general humanitarian assistance and are
present at most complex emergencies.
UNOCHA states that all of its activities are guided by the four principles
of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence as understood by the
ICRC.31 1991General Assembly (GA) resolution 46/182 endorses these principles
as the foundation of the UN’s humanitarianism, entrenching them as global
norms. Additionally, the UN Charter reinforces commitment to international law
and justice, including the Geneva Conventions of the ICRC.32 UN humanitarian
entities draw on the ICRC understanding of humanity as the principle driver for
crisis response.33 UNHCR, UNOCHA, and WFP institutionalize the idea of
impartiality, acting based on need, prioritization of urgency rather than race,
nationality, gender, religious belief, political opinion, or class.34 These bodies say
they refrain from taking sides in hostilities or engaging in political, racial,

31

Bagshaw, Simon. 2012. What are Humanitarian Principles?; UNOCHA.
"UN Charter Principles." United Nations and the Rule of Law., accessed Apr 8, 2017,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/international-law-courts-tribunals/uncharter-principles/.
33
"Humanitarian Principles." UNHCR.,
https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/44766/humanitarian-principles.
34
Ibid.
32
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religious, or ideological controversies to maintain neutrality and independence.35
In reality, the UN is an intergovernmental organization and cannot be independent
from governments’ interests. The mandates of the UNHCR, WFP, and UNOCHA
are technically non-political and humanitarian, but they also must coordinate with
and solicit donations from governments. The UN attempts to maintain autonomy
for its humanitarian branches, but this is not always possible due to the
intergovernmental structure.
Each humanitarian branch of the UN has a unique mission. UNHCR has a
mandate to protect refugees, as "persons outside their country of origin for
reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other
circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order...require international
protection."36 UNHCR was established in 1950 with the initial goal to help
millions of Europeans in the wake of WWII and, in 1954, the organization won a
Nobel Peace Prize for its work on the continent.37 The 1951 Refugee Convention
was a landmark international law to protect refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs). During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, UNHCR accepted
Hungarians as prima facie refugees, which critically shaped the way that
humanitarians would deal with refugees going forward.38 Throughout the rest of
the 20th century, UNHCR played a major role in responding to population shifts

35

Ibid.
"The Mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees and His Office." UNHCR., last
modified October 2013, accessed Apr 8, 2017,
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/526a22cb6/mandate-high-commissioner-refugeesoffice.html.
37
"History of UNHCR." UNHCR., http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/history-of-unhcr.html.
38
Ibid.
36
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and solidified its humanitarian role through its work in the 1990s and into the 21st
century. WFP was established in 1961 with a mission to deliver food assistance in
emergencies and work with communities to build nutrition.39 It provided food aid
during crises of the 20th and 21st centuries, making it the largest humanitarian
agency fighting hunger.40 UNOCHA’s role is “to mobilize and coordinate
principled action,” and it engages with state and non-state actors to do so.41 It was
founded in 1991 through General Assembly resolution 46/182 with a goal of
strengthening UN response to complex emergencies and improving humanitarian
intervention.42 UNOCHA carries out most of its functions through the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) that coordinates with humanitarian
organizations, UN agencies, the ICRC, and various NGOs.43
UNHCR is currently focusing on Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, the Central
African Republic, and Europe. UNHCR has around 10,700 staff members that
work in 128 countries, with about 87 percent of staff based directly in the field.44
UNHCR’s budget was $6.54 billion in 2016, almost entirely funded by voluntary
contributions (meaning it does not receive annual funds from the total UN
budget).45 Of these funds, UNHCR receives 86 percent from governments and the
European Union (EU), 6 percent from IOs and pooled funding mechanisms, 6
percent from the private sector, and a 2 percent subsidy from the UN budget.
39

"Overview." WFP., http://www1.wfp.org/overview.
Ibid.
41
Bagshaw.
42
"History of OCHA." UNOCHA., https://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-weare/history.
43
Ibid.
44
"Where we Work." UNHCR., http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/where-we-work.html.
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UNHCR has been able to assist over 50 million refugees throughout its
organizational lifetime.46
WFP’s current emergency focus is in Iraq, Nigeria, Southern Africa, South
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. WFP works in around 80 countries worldwide with
more than 14,000 staff, 90 percent of whom are located in the field.47 In 2016,
WFP had a budget of $5.9 billion, all from voluntary contributions.48 Only about
.06 percent of its budget in 2016 came from financial institutions, pooled funding,
and private sector donors - the remainder was sourced from governments and the
EU.49 WFP supplies about 12.6 billion rations around the world each year as an
emergency responder.50
UNOCHA works worldwide, with a focus on L3 (most severe, large-scale
crises) in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.51 UNOCHA has around 2,300 staff members
working in over 60 countries.52 For 2015, it had a budget of $334 million, with 96
percent of its funds from governments and 4 percent from multi-donor funds, the
UN annual budget, and private donations.53 UNOCHA was responsible for
soliciting funds for its humanitarian partners and raised/coordinated the use of
$10.7 billion total in 2015. Working with its partners to implement assistance

46
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projects in 2015, UNOCHA coordinated aid that affected around 80 million
people across the globe.54

Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)
MSF was formed in 1971 in France by a group of doctors and journalists
outraged by the war and famine in Biafra. They aimed for an independent
organization that could deliver fast and impartial emergency medical assistance.55
MSF

has

five

foundational

principles:

medical

ethics,

independence,

impartiality/neutrality, bearing witness, and accountability.56 As its assistance is
primarily medical, MSF maintains that it carries out its work with respect of
medical ethics, namely: “the duty to provide care without causing harm to
individuals or groups” and providing high-quality medical care.57 Independence is
a policy of offering assistance based solely on need, maintaining access to
populations, and controlling aid provisions. Impartiality and neutrality are the
same principles for MSF as for the ICRC and UN; it provides assistance on a need
basis without taking into consideration factors like race, religion, gender, political
affiliation, or the demands of governments/warring parties. MSF believes that
speaking out publicly about violence and extreme suffering is also a duty,
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especially when access to care is prohibited or crises are neglected. Lastly, MSF
is committed to accountability and evaluation/reporting of its activities.
MSF is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland with national offices in 28
countries and more than 35,000 staff and volunteers across the world. MSF is a
worldwide movement of 25 independent associations that are members of MSF
International and participate in an International General Assembly with an
independent president who safeguards the mission and protects coordination.58
MSF’s first mission was in Managua in 1972 after an earthquake, with its first
major operation during the 1975 refugee crisis in Cambodia.59 Currently, MSF
has 450 projects in 69 countries in addition to search and rescue operations. It
intervenes based on independent evaluations of medical need.
In 2015, MSF had a budget of around $1.36 billion, 80 percent of which
went

to

its

humanitarian

activities

with

the

remainder

going

to

management/administration.60 Over 5.7 million individual donors provided
around 92 percent of this funding, while just 8 percent came from governments
and IOs.61 To maintain independence, MSF has a policy of only allowing a small
portion of its funds to come directly from governments and IOs.62 In 2015, MSF
conducted 8.6 million outpatient consultations, assisted with over 200,000 births,
and rescued around 24,000 refugees/migrants from sea.63
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Conclusion
Different groups deal with the demands of emergency assistance
corresponding to their principles, priorities, and autonomy. These brief
descriptions of the ICRC, UN, and MSF demonstrate such differences and will
serve as reference points throughout the case studies. None of these organizations
are free from forces of marketization or politicization, yet their principles and
history mean they respond distinctly. The ICRC has described “politics [as] a
moral pollutant,” of humanitarianism, but there is a serious of question as to
whether it is possible or even desirable to separate humanitarianism from
politics.64 MSF is characterized as “more rebellious and rowdy,” because it
focuses on the idea of temoinage or “giving witness” to call attention to the
world’s problems.65 This often involves criticizing political actors, in contrast to
the ICRC’s methods of avoiding conflict. While MSF and the ICRC avoid
reliance on governments, humanitarian operations of the UN do not have such
autonomy, given their funding sources, and many other NGOs are unable to do so.
Understanding these principles and histories helps explain how humanitarians
react to dilemmas and global emergencies.
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Chapter II: Challenges of Relationships, Marketization, and
Competition
Introduction
Humanitarian organizations have positive intentions and attempt to ensure
they achieve those by disciplining their efforts through intentional principles, but
the conditions in which they operate can undermine both practices and outcomes.
The goal is to understand how organizations’ principles interact with institutions
of the aid sector that systematize relationships between humanitarians, donors,
local power, and recipients. Institutions of aid are the “formal and informal rules
of behavior that constitute incentives for all agents involved in the aid delivery
process.”66 Humanitarian organizations must operate within these rules that
determine how emergency aid is delivered. The humanitarian principles discussed
in the prior chapter are meaningless without contextualization. Principles are only
desirable depending on:
how effective they are in specific situations...under certain
conditions, they can be so dysfunctional as to be
counterproductive. How does neutrality help the victims of ethnic
cleansing and genocide? If states are the solution to humanitarian
emergencies and are required to end mass killing, then what good
is independence?67
This chapter begins by describing the relationships between actors and how these
relationships

constrain

humanitarian

organizations.

Challenges

of

the

humanitarian sector are overlapping and nonlinear, but for the sake of simplicity,
this chapter first explains the relations between actors before looking at
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marketization,

and

then

competition

between

agencies.

Humanitarian

organizations are negotiating an environment in which they are appealing to
donors and local authorities while trying to get aid to those who most need it. Not
only do the local power dynamics within complex contingencies impose
challenges to humanitarian organizations, but as soon as more than one
organization is present, that becomes another complication. Interwoven with the
problems arising when actors with different agendas are operating in the same
space are issues of marketization and competition. This chapter examines these
dynamics and how they shift humanitarian organizations’ contributions away
from the ideals to which they aspire. Although these dynamics are broken into
distinct sections for this chapter, it is important to remember that they influence
each other and overlap as will be demonstrated in the case studies.

Relationships with Donors, Local Governments, and Recipients
Humanitarian organizations do not exist in a vacuum. They respond to
dynamic political and security crises while interacting with a multitude of actors.
Humanitarian “institutions - rules of behavior - exist precisely because they are
means

to

partially

overcome...information

problems

and

the

resulting

uncertainties…[yet they] can not create a risk-free world and we have to live with
these residual uncertainties in our daily activities, including in the delivery of
foreign aid.”68 Aid agencies interact with donors, local governments, and
international powers. They are dependent on private and public donors for their
68
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funding and often lose autonomy over agenda-setting as a result. The nature of
limited funding creates competition between organizations and affects their
missions. Organizations are dependent on governments for access to conflict
zones, necessitating political negotiation. Additionally, humanitarian actors must
interact with local powers for security and coordination of aid delivery. These
relations can create friction and lead to compromised principles and outcomes
because organizations are responsible to governments, international bodies, local
powers, donors, and aid recipients in overlapping and conflicting ways. These
relationships are mainly defined by contracts, access, evaluation/feedback, and
principal-agent dilemmas. Issues of imperfect information are also interwoven
throughout.

Contracts
Funds and access for assistance programs are given on a contractual basis,
a system that has grown due to increases in organization number and size. Most
donors and governments issue short-term, renewable contracts filled through a
competitive bidding process where organizations must demonstrate concrete
results for accountability’s sake.69 Winning contracts is a constant focus for
organizations, as they cannot survive without the resources afforded through
them.

69

Cooley, Alexander and James Ron. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity
and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." International Security 27, no. 1 (Jun
1, 2002): 11,
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=library/jrnart/Y2C7
6.
23

In war-related relief, three to six month contracts are increasingly the
norms.70 This short-time span increases insecurity for organizations, as they incur
significant startup costs to begin servicing a new contract. Then, after just three
months, a contract can be severed and agencies are at risk for capacity reductions.
Aid organizations cannot take their survival as a given.71 When aid agencies feel
threatened in this way, there is a strong pressure to renew or extend existing
contracts and to win new contracts regardless of the project’s utility. Other
concerns are pushed to the margins (such as ethics, project efficacy, evaluation,
self-criticism) because securing access and funding is a continual part of
humanitarian operations.
Contracts influence where organizations operate and what sort of
emergency relief services they provide, as donors “affect agency decision making
at every level.”72 Agencies adapt to donor interests, vying for earmarked funds or
changing their approaches based on temporary political leanings. Generally,
contractual funding is available for “loud” emergencies that attract media
attention and resources dry up as soon as a conflict is no longer interesting.73 This
directs NGO behavior, as they have no choice but to follow the contracts they
depend upon. Dependency leads to politicization of aid, as donor governments
often choose to use humanitarian assistance to make public statements or
influence other actors. According to James Fearson, “evidence suggests that
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emergency aid has become, in some large part, a handmaiden of post-cold war
major-power foreign policies.”74

Humanitarians attempt neutrality, but

dependence on donor contracts often makes political agendas unavoidable.

Access
In order to gain access to conflict zones, humanitarian organizations must
work with local governments and international powers. Gaining access means
obtaining consent of involved parties so that humanitarian operations can reach
certain emergency zones.75 This could take the form of establishment of
temporary relief transportation corridors or days/zones of peace. Referring to UN
Resolution

46/182,

humanitarian

access

officially

involves

both

the

humanitarians’ ability to reach populations in need and the affected population’s
ability to access services.76 Political and military forces are often the gatekeepers,
and access can be prevented through bureaucratic restrictions, intensity of
conflict, and direct attacks on humanitarian personnel/assets.77 Negotiations for
access are traditionally determined through engagement with states, often with the
UN serving as an intermediary. Due to this necessity of gaining access,
humanitarian actors often must follow a state’s lead in how they would prefer to
coordinate aid within their countries. Additionally, NGOs are reliant upon states
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to direct political efforts. For example, states are responsible for prosecuting war
criminals within their borders. When states are unwilling to take action,
humanitarian organizations are usually powerless to influence governments
otherwise, as they need their continued cooperation to maintain aid operations.
Since the 1990s, organizations have increasingly had to interact with nonstate actors to gain access to emergency zones. In the past, the UN would avoid
legitimizing non-state actors through negotiations, but the end of the Cold War
led to the proliferation of non-state actors’ involvement in regional conflict,
making it an institutional imperative to negotiation with them.78 This has blurred
the lines of legal and ethical negotiation practices, significantly complicating the
process. Organizations have a multi-part task: identification of who can facilitate
emergency assistance, limiting relations with rogue or militant actors, and
creating incentives for other local actors to contribute to the humanitarian
project.79 Although organizations often attempt a principled approach to refuse
negotiations with violent or insurgent groups, there exists a “specter of ‘gray
humanitarianism,’” where agencies navigate a variety of actors.80 As local powers
do not always want aid agencies operating in the region, or only want them to
operate on specific terms, it can be extremely difficult to gain access.
Often accessing a region means acquiescing to local powers’ demands,
even if they are belligerents. If one agency makes concessions, then there is
pressure on other organizations to follow suit. For example, an organization may
78
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be willing to pay bribes to access victims, and this can establish precedent. Local
actors seek which humanitarian actors will allow for the greatest amount of
extortion.81 This causes organizations to one-up each other in making deals,
leading to “atomistic actions by individual agencies,” as they are fearful of losing
access or influence in a region.82 These choices have ambiguous consequences
where recipients may benefit from aid, but violent non-state actors are legitimized
or the neutrality of aid is undermined.83
To maintain access, some organizations, like the ICRC, “are open to
engaging with belligerents on all sides,” which has proven successful in some
instances.84 Aid organizations often position themselves outside the power
dynamics of a crisis, reiterating impartiality and neutrality when possible.85
Humanitarians attempt to find overlap between the interests of those in control
and their organizations; such alignment is critical for access. For example, MSF
benefits both civilians and wounded combatants, which is often a strong selling
point.86
There is a fine line between being a minor component of a political
narrative (often unavoidable) and significantly contributing to a political or
military goal.87 Thus, in his recent book, Peter Hoffman asks, “can humanitarians
remain oblivious to incentive structures and spoiler behavior by local actors
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whom they are helping?”88 In negotiating access, humanitarians must make
decisions about legitimate actors, political agendas, and the ultimate effects of
their assistance.

Feedback Loop and Evaluations
Aid agencies are placed in the middle of two critical stakeholders: donors
and recipients. Yet, beneficiaries and benefactors are far apart geographically and
politically.89 This means the two parties often lack information regarding the
other. To make matters worse, there is a power imbalance where donors are
usually judicious providers and recipients are expected to be welcoming
acceptors.90 In Stephen Hopgood’s words: “one is the realm of ends, of dignity,
the other of means.”91 Aid agencies must deal with both sides of this spectrum
and often defer to powerful donors. The reliance of aid agencies on donors’
definitions of good performance means donors hold aid agencies accountable
while recipients are unable to do so. Another way to think about this is that aid
agencies are split between motives and consequences.92 Donors provide the
motives when they earmark funds for certain uses, while recipients experience the
consequences of aid programs. In this way, recipients seem better posed to
determine what they need and how aid will be received. However, beneficiaries’

88

Hoffman and Weiss, 99.
Martens et al.
90
Hopgood, Stephen. "Saying "no" to Wal-Mart? Money and Morality." In
Humanitarianism in Question : Politics, Power, Ethics. 1st ed., 98-123. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2008.
91
Ibid, 112.
92
Ibid.
89

28

views may also be biased, as they do not pay for benefits and their preferences are
unlikely to coincide with donors.
The question of how to define good humanitarian performance in the face
of complex emergencies is a major challenge. Conventionally, effectiveness is
considered the extent to which humanitarian’s main aim in an emergency is
attained, for example mere reduction in mortality.93 The Sphere Project,

a

voluntary initiative composed of around 20 major humanitarian agencies, began
in 1997 as an attempt to codify “minimum standards of aid,” including “evidencebased standards,” however this has been less influential than hoped.94 How can
minimum standards be determined based on normal conditions, when each
emergency is relatively unique?95 Efforts are constrained by resources and
situational demands. Donors and recipients often add additional requirements with
different criteria for success, leaving providers caught in the middle. Coordinators
of emergency assistance are outsiders, which creates an inherent perspective
problem, where outsiders and insiders may see the needs of a recipient population
differently. Outsiders often lack understanding of the conflict and its history and
this lack of information reduces the meaningfulness of evaluation conditions.
Humanitarian

organizations

combine

these

external

requirements

and

expectations with their own principles and priorities. There is an increasing effort
for downward accountability to beneficiaries, but poor communication and
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misunderstanding make this hard in practice.96 Overall, the evaluation process is
not an easy one and ultimately, any system of singular accountability is flawed
due to the incentive biases as “the large power asymmetry between providers and
recipients set limits to what can be achieved.”97
A further problem regarding evaluation of humanitarian aid is a faulty
feedback loop system that leads to dysfunction. A feedback loop is a tool that
allows a system to analyze its output and make adjustments to improve its
performance to meet a desired response. However, for such a loop to function,
information must flow between components of the system. If a complete and
functional connection existed, donors and aid providers would receive full
information from recipients about the quality of aid and its impact, then donors
and providers would adjust their priorities and programs while also passing
relevant information to recipients. However, within foreign aid there is vast
inequity of information and a broken feedback loop where donors and recipients
likely never interact. Martens describes that the:
Nature of foreign aid - with a broken information feedback loop combined with the nature of public administrations (including aid
agencies) in general - with multiple hard-to-measure objectives and
often multiple principals too - put a number of inherent constraints
on the performance of foreign aid programmes. All these
constraints are due to imperfect information flows in the aid
delivery process.98
Breaking this down, Martens is asserting that the aid sector struggles from
a lack of connection between donors and recipients that is made worse with the
96
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difficulty of evaluation (especially of emergency intervention), multiple actors,
organizational bureaucracy, and imperfect information. Martens explores how the
broken feedback loop is further perpetuated by the challenges of evaluating
humanitarian aid, especially in emergency situations, even though evaluation
systems attempt to correct the loop.99
Institutions holding donors and recipients accountable are lacking so
donors are often unresponsive to the needs and/or desires of beneficiaries because
there is no connection between them. Even if donors want to gather information
from recipients, there are barriers to doing so. Geographical distance, lack of
infrastructure, and high costs are just a few of these challenges. A good negative
analogy is the information relationship between politicians and constituents.
While politicians may be outsiders, they must be responsive to their constituents’
interests because they are reliant upon their affirmation for election. In contrast,
beneficiaries do not hold donors accountable by any means, and so they can act
out of ignorance or self-interest with impunity.
Evaluations have increased in both prevalence and intensity to create an
explicit information connection throughout the sector, but they have also been coopted and warped from their original purpose. Organizations must ask how much
of their budget should be spent on evaluations, a tough question for some. Further,
agency interests can easily manipulate evaluations, whether that is reducing the
costs of evaluation, changing the quality, or adapting their programs to fit donors’
priorities. Using evaluations as an explicit feedback loop cannot correct for the
99
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brokenness of the system, as it does not actually complete the loop (usually
missing any evaluation of recipients’ opinions) and is susceptible to manipulation.
Additionally, organizations are often insulated from feedback or lack the ability to
respond to it. There is no competitive response from agencies despite the
existence of evaluative mechanisms. It is challenging for aid organizations to
evaluate their efforts or utilize new information when time spent operating in a
conflict zone may be brief or dangerous and organizations do not have excess
funds.100 This means inefficient practices are not effectively removed even if
organizations identify them.
Demand for evaluations relates to accountability - often donors want a
method for evaluating and comparing aid providers to decide where to send funds.
Expectations for evaluations are on the rise as more aid agencies enter the sector,
so donors hold organizations to a higher standard due to competition. Evaluations
are supposed to influence organizations to understand their flaws and make
improvements to their systems. Yet, with questions about how to evaluate aid and
holes in the feedback system, evaluative mechanisms are often unable to serve
their purpose.

Principal-Agent Dilemma
At all levels of the humanitarian sector, there are processes of delegation
based on the hierarchical nature of the system. Principal-agent problems occur
when one party (the agent) can act and make decisions on behalf of the principal
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(the delegator), even if its actions stray from the principal’s original intent.101
Most organizations are hierarchical structures and, since principals cannot do
everything, they delegate tasks to agents. Delegation inherently implies that the
principal no longer has full information or control. Since there are many actors
involved in the humanitarian sector, the principal-agent problem is persistent.
Hierarchical structures within humanitarian aid worsen this problem. For
example, when taxpayers, as the principals, are providing money to a government
for a certain cause, the government is an agent of the taxpayers, but also becomes
a principal through interactions with aid agencies who provide assistance. With
contract systems and the possibility of various work being delegated, the series of
principal-agent relationships replicates. Aid recipients themselves are also
considered agents, as they may welcome all aid as intended or appropriate
resources for opportunistic gain.102 At every level of the humanitarian sector,
there are elements of delegation and thus complicated structures of principalagent relationships.
Within principal-agent relationships there is a unique type of moral
hazard, where an agent deviates from the instructions provided by a principal and
instead carries out a task to advance personal interests or other motivations.103
This moral hazard does not always take the same form and some institutional
aspects of the humanitarian sector worsen or increase the likelihood of deviation.
For example, imperfect information between donors, aid agencies, and recipients
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allows agents to stray from the principal’s intention. The agent may be able to
deviate from instructions because the principal receives imperfect knowledge
about the contractor’s activities. A lack of evaluation mechanisms within
emergency aid makes it harder for principals to know what agents are actually
doing, thus increasing the ability of an agent to co-opt a task. Additionally,
adverse selection may occur where the agent possesses information that is
unavailable to a principal and can manipulate the situation counter to a principal’s
interests.104
The contract system has made the power of information even more
important in principal-agent relationships. Aid agencies that receive contracts are
more likely to use information to their advantage and guide action to serve their
interests rather than the interests of the donor or principal. As contracts are
increasingly competitive, organizations have greater incentives to conceal
information and influence tasks in their favor. Agencies may conceal information
when projects are not going well or if they know projects will be renewed after
little evaluation because they have no incentive to report failing or inappropriate
projects. This can become a vicious component of the contract cycle and
evaluation requirements, as concealment and short contracts weaken the trust
between principals and agents.
In the humanitarian sector, the presence of many actors means a given
agent may maneuver between multiple objectives from multiple principals. For
example, one organization may receive funding from one entity and access to a
104
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conflict zone from another and thus are caught between the parties’ objectives. If
recipients are considered agents, then they are often dealing with this situation
when multiple agencies are providing aid and recipients must react to the
influence of many objectives.

Marketization
Recent trends in humanitarian assistance complicate the web of
relationships even further. Alexander Cooley and James Ron describe the
humanitarian sector as characterized by increasing organizational density and
marketization, which lead to insecurity, competitive pressures, and fiscal
uncertainty.105 These elements affect how organizations seek access to emergency
situations and how they maintain operations.
The

sector

has

grown

tremendously,

from

1,000

international

organizations in 1960 to over 5,500 by 1996 and an expansion of operations by
150 percent from 1985 to 1995.106 Spending has also increased; for example,
USAID spent just $297 million in 1989 but by 1993, they spent $1.2 billion. Total
spending on NGOs grew from $.28 billion in 1980 to $5.7 billion in 1993.107 By
2010, aid flows reached around $12 billion annually.108 For 2015, the
international humanitarian budget reached $28 billion.109
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This increase in numbers is cumulative, as growth in organizations leads
to further reliance on NGOs, which then allows them to grow in numbers and
funding. The barriers to entry for the humanitarian sector are relatively low,
allowing for the proliferation of organizations.
As the number of organizations grows, the challenges of marketization
intensify and lead to more insecurity and competition. As defined in the
introduction, marketization occurs when the humanitarian sector is exposed to
market forces so that organizations compete like for-profit corporations even
though they do not generate a profit. Cooley and Ron argue, with reference to
density and marketization, that “these powerful institutional imperatives can
subvert IO/NGO efforts, extend inappropriate aid projects, and promote
destructive competition.”110
They apply New Economics of Organization (NEO) theory to explain
patterns of behavior and outcomes that fall outside the theories usually relied
upon to understand humanitarianism. Realism and liberalism do not include utility
functions of humanitarian actors, assuming their goals are the same as the states
that fund them.111 Neoliberal theories assume that dysfunctional behavior and
competition do not occur in the humanitarian aid space, instead presuming
cooperation. Yet, Cooley and Ron explain that NGOs internalize the values,
goals, and methods of their institutional environment.112 Thus, as international aid
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is increasingly organized like the for-profit sector, material incentives have
greater influence over humanitarian organizations. This is a self-perpetuating
cycle: the institutions and subsequent behaviors are strengthened as NGOs mimic
private-sector models in structure. Contractual relations, incomplete information,
transaction costs, and property rights complicate these institutions. The contract
system pushes NGOs toward the private-sector model most strongly, as aid
providers cannot take their survival for granted and continually seek new
contracts.113 Overall applying NEO theory demonstrates that these institutional
dynamics generate “organizational imperatives that promote self-interested action,
inter-INGO competition, and poor project implementation.”114 This helps explain
phenomena like compromises for access and principal-agent moral hazard issues
that arise.
The meaning of humanitarianism itself can be coopted by marketization.
Organizations may adjust their missions or values to better align with donors,
rather than the needs of aid recipients or humanitarian principles broadly.
Organizations may also have incentives to modify their outcomes to make it
appear as if they are more successful. Stephen Hopgood describes this
phenomenon as:
Mission effect is the surrogate for profits. Mission aligns the
organization with its stakeholders, sets the boundaries for the
organization, and provides the foundation on which trust is
developed. Strong NGO brands succinctly articulate their missions
in terms of what, how, and for whom; these missions are
equivalent in many ways to brand positioning statements.115
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The changing of mission does not necessarily cause dysfunction or
unethical intervention, but it can. There is evidence that organizations define
performance in terms of incentives within the aid delivery process rather than
recipient outcomes.116 Additionally, pressures arise from donors that lead to
greater convergence towards what donors want to fund.117 NGOs can quickly
determine what types of goals will receive more money and then tailor programs
towards those goals. Finnemore and Barnett say that when agencies adjust
“missions to fit the existing, well-known, and comfortable rulebook…[the]
means...may become so embedded and powerful that they determine ends and the
way the organization defines its goals.”118
Marketization does not affect all types of organizations equally. Smaller
organizations’ survival may be genuinely threatened, but large and wellestablished organizations will not be driven to extinction. Instead, for
organizations like the ICRC and MSF, the humanitarian sphere has grown more
complicated. They must cooperate and work alongside organizations that lack
principles, technical expertise, or historical knowledge. This serves to
compromise their image as humanitarians, as local communities do not always
distinguish between agencies. Additionally, funding is scarcer for everybody and
increases general sector stress. Overall, marketization of aid has fundamentally
changed the humanitarian sector, creating greater uncertainty that leads to
dysfunction among actors.
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Coordination and Competition
Even as density and marketization exacerbate competition between
humanitarian organizations, many entities increasingly advocate for coordination
among them.
Coordination is defined by Larry Minear as “systematic utilization of
policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective
manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and
managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and assuring accountability; (4)
orchestrating a functional division of labor in the field; (5) negotiation and
maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and (6)
providing leadership.”119 Coordination is often heralded as a solution to
challenges of aid, such as imperfect information or security risks. Sometimes
governments require cooperation or determine which organizations are allowed in
the country. To do this, governments often pass crisis management (particularly
regarding refugees) to a UN agency. In 2005, the UN tried to resolve the problem
of coordination independently of states, with a Cluster Approach to organize all
NGOs responding to a crisis under certain lead NGOs in an area. Some
organizations feel this is effective, while others reject the loss of autonomy that it
requires.120
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Indeed, not all organizations want to cooperate with each other. According
to Sommers,
Probably the most important assumption underlying successful
humanitarian coordination is that all involved feel it is necessary.
But they do not...Some humanitarian actors, at least in certain
circumstances, view coordinated action as restrictive of internal
objectives and even counter to fundamental humanitarian
principles. In other words, the most ‘effective’ humanitarian
response may not necessarily be ‘cohesive’ at all.121
Some organizations distinguish themselves from others on a principled basis and
they see other humanitarians as potentially compromising to their identity. For
example, if an NGO refuses to recognize a militia group as legitimate, then they
will be hesitant to collaborate with an organization that openly works with the
group. There is great “difficulty of maintaining a unified coordination structure
when key actors are deeply divided against each other.”122 This complicates
coordinating tasks for the UN and other bodies.
Resistance to coordination and increased competition relate to contracts,
systems of access, inequality of information, and need for donations. A UNOCHA
study on sector coordination describes “donor earmarking, micro-management,
visibility

concerns,

and

political

agendas,”

along

with

“demonstrated

preoccupation with securing funding,” as factors that weaken coordination.123
Organizations quickly determine that it is:
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more profitable and institutionally logical for a humanitarian actor
to command a larger percentage of a particular sector, camp, or
region even at the expense of coordination with other humanitarian
actors. Since larger field operations call for bigger budgets,
coordination runs against the institutional grain because each actor
seeks a bigger piece of the humanitarian pie.124
Interestingly, organizations seem willing to allow competition for a bigger piece
of pie even if it actually reduces the size of the overall pie. That is to say, they
will undermine cooperation in a way that will decrease donors’ willingness to
supply funds or that will reduce the benefit of aid to recipients. For example, an
organization may be willing to compromise with a militant group because
“competition for turf and difficulties of coordination...make [today’s]
humanitarian actors easy targets for political actors seeking access to the scarce
resources they control,” even if security risks result.125 This behavior reflects
perception of a zero-sum game between providers as they compete for donor
funds and emergency access. There is often a limited amount of funding and
access, so they must compete for it. This problem has increased with the entrance
of more organizations into the humanitarian sector and greater reliance on
contract systems.
This competition also leads to repeated attempts for differentiation.
Organizations want to distinguish themselves to increase chances of receiving
funds and contracts. This is analogous to product differentiation in the traditional
marketplace - NGOs do not want to be seen as mere substitutes for one another.
Assumptions of sector universality and unity are false as organizations re-define
124
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their principles in attempts to demonstrate uniqueness. Barnett and Weiss describe
this process:
as aid agencies debate who they are and what practices are
reflective of their identity, they simultaneously reveal who they
believe they are not and the practices they deem illegitimate. The
attempt to define the humanitarian identity, in other words, reflects
a desire to define difference.126
In doing so, organizations “seem to be driven by both values and interests,”
meaning that they attempt to define principles while also furthering their material
goals, evident “where some [organizations] appeared to be ‘pornographers of
death,’ caring more about constructing heroic images of themselves for donors
than about the plights of the victims.”127 Some organizations may stick closely to
principles. For example, the ICRC is often seen as the “credible interlocutor,” but
other NGOs “are almost always willing to compete and deliver what[ever] a
donor desires.”128
These trends in the humanitarian sector also affect the operations within
various organizations, as aspects of competition and insecurity trickle down to
inter-organizational

interactions.

The

effects

of

market-like

forces

on

humanitarian organizations influence incentive structures within organizations. 129
For example, as competition for resources becomes more intense between
organizations, subunits of organizations also compete with each other for resource
allocations. This begins a cycle of bargaining games not just between aid
agencies, but also within them. People working for organizations are forced to
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deal with “environments [that] are often ambiguous about missions and contain
varied, often conflicting, functional, normative, and legitimacy imperatives.”130
As international organizations reproduce these contradictions based on the
institutional signals they receive, employees and volunteers grapple with conflicts
between ethics, resources, and mission goals. Incentives and signals demonstrate
that certain behaviors will be rewarded, and aid workers respond to these
messages. When “optimising agents face incentives and constraints that deviate
their behavior from [a] target” of delivering aid with positive effects towards a
target of the general aid delivery process, it is unsurprising that sub-optimal
outcomes result.131 Since rules and routines within organizations respond to
environmental stimuli, problematic ritualized behavior can result. Although this
dysfunctional behavior may look somewhat different based on the type of
organization, even large agencies have trouble avoiding institutional pressures as
all organizations operate within the broader environment of emergency aid.

Conclusion
The challenges of maintaining relations with many actors, pressures of
marketization, and institutional factors increasingly define the humanitarian
sector. Although not all these elements are present in every situation, they affect
how organizations interact with donors, recipients, and local actors. As
humanitarians compete for donors and access, they pander to them, seek
differentiation, accept problematic contracts, inadvertently reduce productivity,
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and give up their principles. While doing so, organizations resist coordination
amongst each other due to competition and a desire for autonomy. These
dynamics often mean the neediest people do not receive sufficient assistance
because humanitarian actors cannot overcome issues of density, marketization,
and dependency. The following case studies will demonstrate how these
challenges transpire in Rwanda and Afghanistan, how they conflict with
organizations’ goals, and how these tensions result in sub-optimal outcomes or
aggravated conflicts.
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Chapter III: Background on Rwandan Genocide
Introduction
The Rwandan genocide and subsequent refugee crisis during the 1990s
exemplifies the detrimental effects of international humanitarian assistance when
agencies face challenges. To understand the complex humanitarian emergency
that came in the wake of the genocide, a description of the genocide and the role
of international actors is useful. The genocide itself was a political crisis, where
humanitarian actors had little significance. The following chapter contextualizes
the complex environment that humanitarians faced in the post-genocide
humanitarian crisis.

Genocide Background
The Rwandan genocide occurred during the early summer of 1994,
building on decades of ethnic tension between Hutus and Tutsi. With
decolonization of Rwanda in 1947, Hutus were given the opportunity to seek
power over the minority Tutsis, who had been privileged by colonial rule.
Rwanda officially gained independence from Belgium in 1962 with the Hutus in
power, by which time ethnic violence was a “central feature of Rwanda’s
politics.”132 In 1973 President Habyarimana took power through a coup d’état and
allowed for the registration of explicitly racist parties to keep the Tutsi from
gaining power. Tensions escalated to violence and extremist Hutu leaders blamed

132

Barnett, Michael N. 2002. Eyewitness to a Genocide. 52. publ. ed. Ithaca, NY [u.a.]:
Cornell Univ. Press.
45

it on the Tutsi (claiming that any action against the minority group was
reactionary).133 Members of the Rwandan Hutu elite allowed this violence to
continue and even encouraged it, as they grew concerned about losing power.
In response, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) began to
consolidate military and political strength. Their goal was to repatriate Tutsi
refugees and share power with the Rwandan government. War between the RPF
and Rwandan government began in October 1990, exacerbating racial tensions.
After intervention by the French to help Habyarimana’s government, as well as
months of negotiation, President Habyarimana and the RPF signed a peace accord
to create a coalition Hutu-RPF government.134 Habyarimana stalled while militia
training intensified and extremist radio stations broadcasted programs about
killing Tutsis.
On April 6, 1994 presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of
Burundi were killed when their plane was shot down, becoming the pretext for a
genocidal campaign against the Tutsis. Thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus,
perceived to be supporting the RPF, were raped, mutilated, and massacred.135
Around one million lives were cut short between April 6 and July 19, 1994. This
massacre was an efficient killing spree, explicitly supported by local officials and
the national government.136 Journalists in Kigali described the operation as well-
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planned and thorough.137 As a result, more people died in less time than any other
massacre of modern history.138
Leading up to the genocide, there was a UN peacekeeping mission, UN
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), but due to recent failures to maintain peace in
Somalia, many parties opposed strengthening the operations in Rwanda.139
General Dallaire, head of UNAMIR, requested additional troops after receiving
intelligence of plans for mass killings of the Tutsi population, but was told to do
nothing by the UNSC as the US, France, and Belgium dismissed any threats.140
Countries like the US had little strategic interest in Rwanda and did not support
international action. Foreign governments were explicitly not using the word
genocide publicly, as that would require action. States were operating under the
“never again” principle after failure to prevent tragedy in Somalia. The US
government was worried that if the term genocide was used, there would be an
obligation to act due to powerful international norms.141 As a result, alternative
terms like “humanitarian crimes” were used to describe the situation in Rwanda.
Powers like the US continued to deny the occurrence of genocide even when on
April 28, 1994, Oxfam, a large aid agency, declared a genocide occurring in
Rwanda and UNAMIR and the ICRC issued similar statements soon thereafter.142
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In May, the UN Secretary-General announced there was a genocide in
Rwanda and by the end of the month, the UNSC had passed a resolution
containing the word genocide and sent in troops. Official use of the word
genocide created immense pressure to act, yet as late as June 1994, Christine
Shelly, then-spokesperson for the US State Department, officially stated there was
reason to believe “acts of genocide” occurred. When a reporter asked how many
acts of genocide it takes to make a genocide, Shelly responded, “that’s just not a
question that I’m in a position to answer.”143 This delay in acknowledging reality
meant the international community had no role in preventing or stopping the
genocide.
At the end of June, France launched Operation Turquoise to establish a
safe zone in the south-west of Rwanda, a mission supported by the UN.144
Although this deployment was supposed to create peace, the French supported the
Hutu government as long as possible.145 Many criticized the French as propping
up the Hutu regime and allowing génocidaires to escape justice. Many actors were
pessimistic about the effects of Operation Turquoise, though in the end, France
did protect thousands of Tutsis.
Role of Humanitarian Actors during Genocide
Humanitarian actors do not have a blank slate when they enter a crisis
zone; they carry a reputation. The ICRC, the UN, and MSF had a presence in
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Rwanda leading up to and during the genocide that defined how they could
respond to the refugee humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes that followed the
genocide’s end.
The ICRC refused to deviate from its self-imposed regulations of
neutrality and refraining judgment of who should receive aid.146 The ICRC had
already been operating in Rwanda throughout the war of the 1990s and witnessed
the peace agreement brokered by the French. Phillipe Gaillard, head of the ICRC
delegation from 1993-1994 recalled that prevention and reporting on the
developments in Rwanda was a priority for the organization.147 This contribution
to reporting was unprecedented in the organization’s 130 years of existence,
although the ICRC quickly discovered that their reporting was ineffective and
prevention of the genocide was impossible; “as a Red Cross worker, you really
don’t have the political - not to mention the military - means to stop” a
genocide.148 Gaillard maintains that neutrality was effective in Rwanda
throughout the genocide, as the ICRC hospital had a “mixed population” and
“became some kind of a sacred place, a strong symbol and demonstration of
neutrality,” since it opened its doors to RPF, Hutu, Tutsi, and government
forces.149 Gaillard describes the humanitarian enterprise of the ICRC as “an effort
to bring a measure of humanity, always insufficient, into situations that should not
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exist.”150 Politicized humanitarianism was nonsensical when there was no
opportunity for political action.
MSF had also been operating in Rwanda and neighboring countries
throughout the early 1990s, often in joint-missions with the ICRC. At first, MSF
focused on neutral provision of technical assistance, helping the ICRC run
hospitals across Rwanda. Yet, after the spread of systematic killing, MSF was
restricted in Rwanda due to safety concerns.151 MSF’s ties to Belgium and a
perception of MSF alignment with the Tutsi made the volunteers a target for
violence. All members of MSF Belgium were evacuated from the country, along
with many other volunteers. Those that remained worked under the ICRC and
avoided mention of MSF to reduce risk of violence.152 In order to continue
providing technical assistance in Rwanda, MSF was forced to stay silent as the
ICRC was to be the only spokesperson from a neutral standpoint. MSF was split
as many called for the release of a formal statement about the genocide. Rony
Brauman, co-founder of MSF, described this tension as:
one of the constitutive paradoxes of humanitarianism: on the one
hand, we are held to act on a certain level as if it was the suffering
of populations and not political reality that should be our principal
concern. On the other, we have a duty to be lucid politically. That
has led us to draw a line beyond which the necessary negotiations
and compromises with local authorities become unacceptable.153
By April, MSF France and MSF Holland began publicly criticizing the
United Nations and international community as “abandoning the Rwandan
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people,” when they failed to provide security by reducing the number of UN
peacekeepers.154 MSF had been traditionally willing to negotiate with violent
groups, such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Taliban in Afghanistan, but
thought that the explicit extermination of the Tutsi crossed a line and
humanitarian aid was no longer useful.155 MSF began campaigning the West to
have Rwanda recognized as a genocide and begin international military
intervention. On April 29, 1994 the MSF Belgium Director of Operations George
Dallemagne said that “a veritable genocide is underway in Rwanda...The
international community cannot close its eyes to the massacres.”156 MSF
struggled with feelings that the situation was out of control - it was “impossible to
protect the wounded and international staff,” which strengthened its resolve that
the international community had to face the truth of the genocide.157 MSF wanted
to reiterate, “it acts and expresses itself independently of any political power.”158
With the principle of independence in mind, MSF also made its objective to “see
military action guided by clear political objectives, with aid organizations
assisting with humanitarian action,” rather than the mixing of militarism and
humanitarianism.159 This objective for coherent political and military action,
separate from independent and effective humanitarianism was maintained by
MSF throughout their work in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region.
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The UN did not have a large humanitarian role in Rwanda leading up to or
during the genocide. The UN deployed UNAMIR within Rwanda as a
peacekeeping mission to facilitate negotiations after the civil war. Prior to the
genocide, the goals in Rwanda were economic and political. There was no need
for UNHCR to operate within the country during the early 1990s. Similarly, WFP
had no role in Rwanda before or during the genocide160 and UNOCHA was not
yet equipped to coordinate a response (and actually played no role in responding
to the post-genocide crisis).161 A need to balance humanitarian assistance to
refugees and the pressure exerted upon it by the international community would
define the UN objectives in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region after the
genocide.

Post-Genocide Emergency
In response to the genocide, the RPF invaded Rwanda and civil war raged
alongside the genocidal slaughters. The mass killings ended with the defeat of the
Rwandan government by the RPF in July 1994, when their army captured Kigali.
As a result, the former government and thousands of Hutus fled to Zaire (now
Democratic Republic of the Congo), Tanzania, and Burundi. Nearly a million
Rwandans were dead, the country was in crisis in the aftermath of the violence,
neighboring states were now hosting thousands of refugees, water and food and
medical supplies were in short supply, and local infrastructure needed repair. In
short, the genocide was over, but the humanitarian crisis was just beginning.
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Two million Rwandans fled to neighboring countries. Some Tutsi
populations attempted to flee the genocide, but the waves of Hutus that left after
the RPF took control were larger. Thousands of Hutus participated in the
genocide due to hatred, financial gain, and fear so when the RPF gained ground,
Hutus fled for fear of retaliation.162 In one 24-hour period alone, about 170,000
Rwandans crossed into the Ngara district of Tanzania. Shortly after around 700,00
Rwandans crossed in North Kivu of Zaire in just three days in July 1994.163 An
aid worker at the time described the hills as “nothing but people. The hills were
covered with a moving mass. The entire African landscaped was awash with
people, all headed our way.”164 This movement created a major humanitarian
crisis throughout the Great Lakes Region of Africa as Tanzania, Burundi, and
Zaire were unprepared to handle the influx of refugees.
The lack of infrastructure to aid refugees led to high mortality rates during
the first few weeks of the emergency.165 The disease outbreaks in the Goma camp
in Zaire were particularly severe.

Within the first few weeks of Goma’s

establishment, cholera broke out and six hundred deaths a day rapidly increased to
estimates of three thousand deaths daily.166 In total, there were about 80,000 cases
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of cholera within the first month.167 Between 6 and 10 percent of the total refugee
population in Goma died - a major public health disaster.168 This combination of
post-genocide insecurity, resettlement needs, and health crisis was the situation
humanitarian actors faced when they arrived to the Great Lakes Region in July
1994.
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Chapter IV: Rwandan Refugee Crisis Case Study
Introduction
As explained in the prior chapter, there was a terrible genocide in Rwanda
creating a complicated situation with many actors and interests at play. From the
outset of responding to the refugee crisis, humanitarian organizations were
compromised by impressions and actions that occurred during the genocide itself.
This chapter focuses on the humanitarian action to address the complex
emergency post-genocide, namely the rapid creation of refugee camps throughout
Tanzania, Zaire, and Burundi. First, the crisis-specific missions, goals, and
principles are explained, before details are offered on the challenges faced by
coordinating with donors, local actors, and international powers. Finally, the
responses of the ICRC, UN, and MSF will be described before analyzing how
their reactions relate to institutional pressures.
The Rwandan refugee crisis represents a situation where humanitarian
actors failed to understand political intricacies, allowing donors to warp aid goals
and instrumentalize humanitarianism to fill a void of security intervention.
Competition between NGOs worsened the situation and reduced their ability to
question proceedings. A lack of evaluation and feedback meant most
organizations did not consider their actions’ broader implications for the Great
Lakes region. In the end, as Phillip Gourevitch stated, the Rwandan refugee
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camps became the “ultimate examples of corrupted humanitarianism - of
humanitarianism in the service of extreme inhumanity.”169

Organization Goals
ICRC Mission/Goal
At the conclusion of the genocide, the ICRC released a press statement
stressing “its desire to help ensure, in agreement with the parties concerned and
insofar as its means allow, respect for the humanitarian rules and to carry out the
tasks conferred upon it by international humanitarian law.”170 Neutrality was
repeatedly emphasized, as well as promotion of “relief operations for the civilian
population that are solely humanitarian, impartial, and non-discriminatory in
nature.”171 The ICRC maintained this position of neutrality in order to maintain
access to both Hutu and Tutsi populations within and outside Rwanda. This meant
the organization provided aid indiscriminately, focusing on civilians, but also
willing to assist militants and soldiers (even if they had participated in the
genocide). As the ICRC already had operations in the region, it aimed to maintain
its relationships with local actors through an apolitical role. With its mandate to
promote IHL, ICRC continued monitoring the situation and would remind
authorities of their duty to respect civilians and humanitarians.172 Its top priority
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was to ensure a comprehensive humanitarian response respecting neutrality and
independence, while providing medical and food aid.

UN Mission/Goals
The UN’s main humanitarian response to the post-genocide situation was
through UNHCR. Although WFP provided food aid, this was coordinated through
UNHCR. UNHCR’s guiding principles for assisting the Rwandan refugees were:
repatriation, humanitarian imperative to care for the needy, and security.
When UNHCR became involved in the Great Lakes refugee crisis in July
1994, Sadako Ogata, the High Commissioner for Refugees, made a statement
recommending early return of all refugees.173 Although safe repatriation is always
a goal of the UNHCR, the organization prioritized this from the beginning.174 The
agency was involved in the crisis beyond its normal capacity, handling a general
humanitarian response, rather than one focused on refugees.175 Overextension
meant UNHCR broke many of its norms for handling refugee issues. Aid workers
were unable to disarm the fighters who filled the camps. A lack of organization
led to health crises of dysentery and cholera. UNHCR also had to play an
important role between various stakeholders, standing in for an absence of other
UN intervention.176 For example, they coordinated between Zairean authorities,
refugees, camp leadership, the Rwandan government, the international
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community, NGOs, and donors. UNHCR recognized the precarious nature of the
situation and tried to encourage repatriation to prevent prolonging the crisis and
improve regional security.

MSF Mission/Goals
MSF mobilized after the Rwandan genocide in response to the refugee
cholera epidemic.177 Across Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire, and Burundi MSF ran field
hospitals, health centers, and mental health programs.178 MSF adhered to its
principles of medical ethics and impartiality/neutrality. The principle of bearing
witness also became critical by November 1994, after the initial public health
crisis was addressed. MSF published a special report “Breaking the Cycle,” where
it called for greater protection of refugees and humanitarian workers in Tanzania
and Zaire.179 In this, MSF made its priorities clear as it called upon the UN and its
member states to ensure those involved in the genocide were brought to justice
and more security was provided to the humanitarian situation. MSF was publicly
outraged about the lack of response to the genocide and in its initial refugee
response operations also made its moral outrage clear regarding the absence of
international action to prevent further abuses.
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Challenges
Donor Pressures
Monetary concerns and public relations were large influences on aid
agencies during the Great Lakes crisis. The seemingly non-political aspects of the
refugee crisis attracted government and private donor interest. In particular, the
cholera outbreak in Goma led to “a dramatic, well-publicized show of human
suffering in which the enemy was a virus and the savior was humanitarian aid.”180
Foreign governments have interest in public relations and see channeling
humanitarian aid as ideal publicity.181 J. Brian Atwood, then-head of USAID,
called the refugee health crisis “chaos,” which was more than he said during the
genocide itself , “depoliticiz[ing] the situation and avoid[ing] apportioning blame
or responsibility.”182 Countries like the US began to send money and personnel
that they had not provided weeks earlier.183 Huge amounts of money were raised;
around $1.5 billion was collected for immediate efforts and UNHCR operated on
a daily budget of $1 million.184 This increased the pressure to act, as aid providers
had an interest in gaining lucrative contracts provided by the UN and donor
governments. There was a fine line between organizations acting to alleviate the
crisis and those trying to raise funds from it.185 There was also fear that not
responding to the Rwandan refugee crisis could jeopardize future contracts. Even
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when security in the region worsened, many organizations were hesitant to leave
because money was still there.186
This money also directed where the majority of aid was supplied.
Hundreds of NGOs descended upon the region. Humanitarian zones typically
wave flags to signal the presence of humanitarian work to warring parties, but the
camps in Zaire involved a full PR-battle.187 Not only flags were used, MSF even
branded their own Band-Aids. Aid organizations could not just be there, but also
had “to show that [they were] there, to avoid being upstaged by the
competition.”188
In order to receive the support offered by donors, humanitarian actors
followed their guidelines. Troops and money went hand-in-hand for the Great
Lakes refugee crisis, not to mention highly publicized aircraft landings and aid
distribution.189 NGOs are described as taking on “the role of ‘public service
contractors’ on a cautious and ad hoc basis…for many states, NGOs ‘are seen as
the preferred channel for service provision in deliberate substitution for the
state.”190 This trend meant that organizations became a means for states to make
public statements. Since NGOs are dependent on the funds for operation, it was
hard to turn down funds and avoid instrumentalization as public affairs puppets.
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For example, the US government launched Operation Support Hope as a
humanitarian mission to Goma refugee camp and the surrounding area.191
Organizations that usually preferred to stay away from military operations had no
choice but to cooperate, compromising their neutrality. But, Operation Support
Hope did not support NGOs with security. The operation was humanitarian,
meaning that they could not act against refugee warriors nor arrest known war
criminals of the genocide. Instead Operation Support Hope stood by and allowed
war criminals and the former Rwandan army to settle in Goma alongside other
refugees.192 This further undermined humanitarian goals.
Organizations gained access to work outside Rwanda rather than inside the
country due to donor interest. The US spent $231.9 million on humanitarian
assistance outside Rwanda and only spent $73.3 million inside the country.193
Overall, from 1994 to mid-September 1995, twenty times more aid went to the
surrounding area than people living in Rwanda.194 As NGOs were dependent on
donor money to operate, this affected which populations had access to aid,
influencing local authorities’ view of foreign assistance. The massive disparities
between aid for refugees and internally displaced persons in Rwanda or local
communities in Zaire and Tanzania led to tension.195 In particular, the Rwandan
government resented the aid differences, which worsened organizations’ access to
areas of Rwanda, thus further lowering the amount of aid within the country.
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Donors’ influence and involvement actually lowered the legitimacy of
humanitarians in Rwanda. It is important to note that the RPF ended the genocide,
rather than foreign intervention. This fact set the tone for handling the refugee
crisis, as it decreased the legitimacy of aid funded by governments that did not
prevent or stop the genocide.196 NGOs operating based on ease of access further
diminished aid legitimacy because war criminals and the former Rwandan
government ruled the refugee camps. Aid workers had no ability to change this.
The camp structure was described as a “power structure based on a committee of
fifteen or seventeen members, made up of former government, military, and
business leaders...which...controls most of what goes on in the camps.”197 The US
Committee for Refugees also described this phenomenon, saying that the “exiled
regime and its militia maintain control over the refugees through relentless
propaganda,” giving most NGOs no option but to negotiate with them as they
received little support from donors to do anything different.198

Media Influence
The media bolstered the international attention and subsequent demands
for action. The so-called CNN effect of media attention on a particular crisis
increased the pressure for action. When the media began showing the mass
refugee flow out of Rwanda, foreigners assumed victims of the genocide were
fleeing, rather than Hutu perpetrators of violence.199 Thus, the majority of help
196
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was premised on political misunderstanding. The extremely public nature of the
aid meant that the UN and international community were able to generate large
amounts of funding. Media is free publicity for aid agencies.200 The amount of
media attention made it even more important for NGOs to operate in refugee
camps near Rwanda. A failure to respond would have decreased an organization’s
credibility and profile. It was a situation of “be there or die” for many agencies.201
Many organizations desperately needed the support awarded by responding to the
crisis, generating competition between them. Some agencies attempted to
differentiate their work, but most had to conform to the needs of the situation.202
Geography determined where refugee camps were established and which
ones received media acknowledgement. In particular, Goma in Zaire received a
lot of international attention. Goma is remembered for “the landing strip effect,”
as its proximity to a landing strip meant aircrafts were able to easily bring
supplies.203 This led to the vast amount of aid delivered to Goma - setting it apart
from more remote conflict zones that could only be reached through timeconsuming ground travel. More NGOs worked in Goma because it was easy to
reach, and by virtue of its accessibility, more of the public eye was on the camp as
well. However, this media attention was without agenda; it was inconsequential to
the public what exactly an organization did. The media rewarded presence over
outcome.
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Contribution to War Economy
Given the mixed civilian and militant populations in most of the refugee
camps, it was easy for supporters of the former Rwandan government to divert aid
for political and violent purposes. Hutu government leaders took control of many
camps, meaning they could divert resources. They generated revenue through
multiple mechanisms.204 It was common for leadership to inflate population
numbers. For example, in Ngara, leaders initially provided a population count of
350,000, which was corrected to 230,000 people when an official count was
conducted 10 weeks later.205 A similar situation was also documented in Bukavu.
The political and military leadership had no incentive for accurate censuses, so
would sabotage efforts to get a correct count.
Stealing of materials/resources from aid agencies, trading in looted goods,
demanding employment of Hutus for staff, and general bribery/corruption all took
place.206 Theft of supplies happened through diversion and direct looting. Raids of
warehouses occurred throughout 1994 until multiple NGOs threatened withdrawal
as a result.207 Additionally, uneven distribution occurred within most camps. In
Goma, NGOs estimated that the Hutu militia claimed about 60 percent of supplies
for their own uses and to sell back to camp residents.208 For example, the WFP
delivered food to meet the needs of 100,000 more people than actually lived in
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Goma, but high malnutrition rates persisted, indicating theft of supplies.209 A
1994 survey demonstrated that 40 percent of households received less than their
entitled food ration, while around 13 percent received over 5 times the entitled
ration. Taxation also occurred, as camp leadership demanded taxes from the
refugees employed by local agencies. The exact rates varied, but MSF estimated
that camp leadership collected $11,000 per month from local MSF staff alone in
Kahindo.210
International aid allowed the Hutu government and various militants to
sustain themselves and their operations. Ultimately, manipulation meant
“humanitarian aid, intended for the victims, strengthened the power of the very
people who has caused the tragedy [and] the consequences were devastating.”211

Local Government Relations
The relationships with host countries of the refugee camps were
complicated, particularly in Zaire. Based on the need for the Zairean
government’s cooperation to access refugees, it was necessary to satisfy their
requirements. Zaire wanted the refugees settled close to the Rwandan border,
despite UNHCR’s preference to move refugees further inland to prevent possible
security risks.212 Additionally, the Zairean government did not want refugees in
their country for an extended period and were concerned about arms proliferation.
Zaire announced a deadline of December 31, 1995 for all refugees to leave,
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despite international laws against forced repatriation. Furthermore, the UN and
other international organizations were unable to arrest war criminals within the
camps, as it was up to the Zairean authorities to do so. As a result, the defeated
Hutu government sought protection in Zaire.213 Host nations are responsible for
ensuring that refugee camps are only civilian, but the Zairean regime was an ally
of the former Rwandan government. Their reluctance to arrest war criminals or
jeopardize the possibility of a return of Hutu power in Rwanda meant that the
camps remained unsafe.
Zairean officials were complicit with the Hutu government and army
actions, allowing them to receive arms and financial supplies.214 This empowered
the former Rwandan military to conduct raids into Rwanda, creating insecurity to
dissuade return to the country and demonstrate a threat that Hutus would reclaim
Rwanda. These attacks were mainly against genocide survivors. The Hutu
sanctuary in Zaire also led to strengthening of anti-Tutsi propaganda. Former
military and government officials spread messages painting Hutus as the victims
of historical oppression and the recent genocide. Hutu officials used the narrative
of UN failure to their advantage, jumping on the widespread criticisms of UN
forces.215 They argued the UN forces were partial to the Tutsis and did not protect
Hutus. Propaganda included information that refugees returning to Rwanda were
being killed; a pamphlet circulating in Mgugnga said “of all those made to return
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by UNHCR, not one has survived.”216 The former-Hutu government and military
used these strategies to keep refugees under their control. International aid in the
region strengthened these forces and was unable to prevent the worsening of
ethnic relations. Zaire was an unpredictable negotiating partner and most
humanitarian actors had little choice but to obey their orders regarding the
humanitarian operations.

Violence in Camps
The refugee camps surrounding Rwanda were extremely unstable and the
humanitarian community dealt with the security issues because they received little
international support. The Hutu leaders used violence throughout the refugee
camps to maintain control. Security was precarious for both refugees and aid
workers. For example, in 1994, over 4,000 refugees died in a camp in Zaire due to
result of violence from the Hutu militia, undisciplined Zairean soldiers, and other
refugees.217 There were also various allegations of poisonings of refugees
throughout the camps. Additionally, the Canadian branch of CARE withdrew
from the region after its staff were threatened and 35 of its local staff killed.218 In
November 1994, 15 NGOs threatened to leave unless security improved. As a
result, the Hutu former government did dispel some violence, realizing it was in
their best interest to continue receiving aid. Although the situation improved
slightly, violence continued.
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The need for security clashed with donor interests and international
powers. The international community said they prioritized stability, but in
delaying any real political action, further instability resulted.219 The UN and its
member states refused to supply a security force so officials on the ground had to
handle security. Since the UNSC did not take control, UNHCR called for
deployment of a security force, the Zairean Camp Security Contingent (ZCSC)
that was overseen by the Zaire government.220 The lack of international support
meant “Humanitarian actors…[were] being called upon to carry out functions that
they are not equipped to do and which are the purview of international security
actors.”221 This resulted in a biased, ill-prepared security force that engaged in
exploitative activities like taxing refugees and using them for sexual services.
Ultimately, the ZCSC caused more insecurity for refugees because it was seen as
a threat by the Tutsi forces in Rwanda due to Zaire’s support for the Hutu regime.
In response to this perceived threat, the new Tutsi Rwandan government
expressed concern about security, hinting at eventual destruction of the refugee
camps, but the international community continued to take no action.222
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Organization Responses
ICRC Response
The ICRC maintained neutrality as their top priority, which meant
refraining judgment from who should be considered deserving of aid.223 The
ICRC cared about direct consequences of its assistance programs, but was not
worried about the political connotations of helping Hutus versus Tutsis in the
same way as other humanitarians. While other organizations engaged in extensive
internal debate about whether to pull out from the region, this was never a topic
for the ICRC. It adhered to self-imposed regulations and the objectives of the
humanitarian imperative, refusing to deviate. The ICRC did pressure governments
and other actors to improve their assistance, but overall did not take a political
role. As Peter Walker, member of the Editorial Board for the International Review
of the Red Cross said, for the ICRC, leaving the camps was like refusing to treat
an injured drunk driver due to concern they might drink again – totally ridiculous
in the organization’s mind.224 Thus, the ICRC remained in the Great Lakes
Region, providing aid unconditionally, even if it meant that it supported
génocidaires and led to further instability.
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UN Response
The UN, through UNHCR, had a challenging task of coordinating NGOs,
local governments, and assistance from the international community. In its
attempt to reconcile its goals of repatriation and security with the goals of local
actors and donor governments, UNHCR was ultimately unable to fulfill its goals
or principles and helped perpetuate regional insecurity.
UNHCR was involved in the situation beyond its typical mandate or
capacity; one official explained that, “probably never before has [the UNHCR]
found its humanitarian concerns in the midst of such a lethal quagmire of political
and security interest.”225 It played an intermediary role between host
governments, refugees, camp leadership, the new Rwandan government, various
NGOs, and donors. Notably, UNHCR did refuse to meet with the Rwandan
government in exile in Zaire to avoid awarding it any legitimacy.226 However, the
effectiveness of this strategy was reduced because most of the former Hutu
government became camp leaders, so meeting with war criminals became
unavoidable.
The goal of rapid and safe voluntary repatriation was subverted due to
UNHCR’s need to maintain safety in the camps and have a good relationship with
host governments. Zaire pushed strongly for forced repatriation, but UNHCR
could not formally support this, as it violated international law forbidding forced
repatriation.227 This dilemma was challenging for UNHCR, as many within the
225
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organization knew that stability necessitated refugees returning to Rwanda and
Zairean authorities had to be kept happy so some individuals actually advocated
for support of Zaire’s deadline. In the end, UNHCR did not make any public
statement opposing Zaire’s deadline, and received much criticism because of this
breach of international norms.228 This seemed to compromise some of UNHCR’s
core values as the international protector of refugee rights. UNHCR also lacked
coordination with actors inside Rwanda and had no way to know the actual safety
conditions for refugees returning. Without accurate information, it was impossible
to promote voluntary repatriation.229 Other norms for refugee protection were also
broken, as refugees had to stay close to the Rwandan border and it was impossible
for aid workers to disarm all the fighters within the camps.230 UNHCR’s lack of
negotiating power over Zairean authorities and absence of clear strategy from the
outset played into these failures.
UNHCR received nothing in response to its appeal for an international
force of soldiers.231 As mentioned earlier, UNHCR ultimately paid for Zairean
soldiers to patrol the camps, but this had disastrous outcomes of provoking the
RPF to attacks the camps. The UN’s insistence that the UN did not fight, and the
commitment to “the logic of peace, not the logic of war,” actually worsened the
situation.232 The UN was risk-averse, especially in the wake of the disaster in
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Somalia, and there was a strong desire to make the UN look good in its adherence
to the principle of peace.233 Principles clashed with the crisis’s demands.
When security had deteriorated in the camps and it was clear that
génocidaires were being assisted by humanitarians, outspoken organizations like
MSF, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and CARE all pressured
UNHCR to withdraw.234 Internal staff and external advisors called for the same. If
there was no international military presence, Guy Goodwin-Gill explained that the
UNHCR should have pulled out because it was impossible to protect the
refugees.235 UNHCR’s mandate was not general humanitarian assistance, rather
refugee aid. UNHCR did enter into extensive debate and negotiations about
leaving some of the camps, in particular Goma in Zaire and Ngara in Tanzania.236
Yet, UNHCR did not withdraw; the International Protection division said
it had a “mandatory function...in assisting host countries to cope with refugee
influxes…[that] justifies our continued presence even under the most trying
circumstances.”237 Many felt there were no alternatives for action but to stay,
though UNHCR did eventually reduce aid provision in the hopes of minimizing
abuse.238 Dennis McNamara (who directed the International Protection division),
stated that the “agency’s mandate and the humanitarian imperative of caring for
the majority of vulnerable and needy civilians, women, and children made a
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withdrawal impossible.”239 Ogata, the High Commissioner also expressed feelings
that there was a mandate to help due to the presence of innocents. The Assistant
Commissioners described it as a lose-lose situation, as they had to stay to help
women and children, but the humanitarian agencies’ presence contributed to
problems.240
This insistence that UNHCR was just following the humanitarian
imperative to assist the needy was related to career and organizational goals. For
example, Ogata, then-High Commissioner, was concerned about the future of her
career.241 Additionally, there was fear for the future of UNHCR. During the
Kosovo crisis, NATO marginalized UNHCR and made it irrelevant, generating
pressure to demonstrate the importance of UNHCR’s crisis management in the
Great Lakes.242 This concern about personal ambition and the image of the UN
did not help the Rwandan refugees in the long run, but it did help UN staff.
Michael Barnett describes “a nearly inverse relationship between the extent to
which UN staff fulfilled their responsibilities and their subsequent professional
fortunes.”243 The fears of overstepping mandate, of failure, and of taking action
disapproved by powerful states prevented the UN from fulfilling its humanitarian
mandate - as was seen when the RPF and other forces attacked the refugee camps
and humanitarians fled.244 Although an organization like UNHCR seems immune
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from the competitive pressures of the humanitarian sphere, its desperate actions
and statements during the Great Lakes emergency demonstrated otherwise.

MSF Response
MSF debated internally how to navigate the dilemmas in the Rwandan
refugee camps and whether it was making a positive impact. From the start, MSF
used atypical advocacy regarding the crisis. MSF usually opposed military
intervention, as it had in Somalia, because it thought that mixing humanitarianism
and military goals was problematic.245 For the case of the Rwandan genocide and
resulting regional insecurity, MSF requested outside security forces.246 Phillipe
Bieberson, then-president of MSF France, said that “humanitarianism [was]
serving as a cover for the inaction of states...humanitarianism of impassibility and
of the dead end.”247 MSF adamantly advocated for a political solution. Brauman,
one of the founders of MSF, describes their dilemma as:
One of the constitutive paradoxes of humanitarianism. On the one
hand, we are held to act on a certain level as if it was the suffering
of populations and not political reality that should be our principal
concern. On the other, we have a duty to be lucid politically. That
has led us to draw a line beyond which the necessary negotiations
and compromises with local authorities become unacceptable.248
MSF provided its technical expertise and medical care throughout 1994,
while advocating for international intervention. Yet debate whether MSF should
stay in the refugee camps continued. MSF recognized that the manipulation of aid
and control of political-administrative leaders was not unique; rather the unique
245

Rieff.
Ibid, 167.
247
Ibid
248
Ibid.
246

74

aspect was that perpetrators of genocide were running the camps.249 As a result,
MSF created pressures to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of the genocide,
demands for more monitoring/censuses to reduce aid diversion, and
recommendations to the UN and member states to send security forces.250 As time
went on, the various branches of MSF “acknowledged that the situation was
intolerable, but the sections’ conclusions differed,” with only Belgium and France
in support of complete or partial withdrawal.251
By October 1994, the internal debate heightened due to a clear lack of
international support for UNHCR’s proposed security initiatives.252 For MSF, it
was a question of complicity - “should a humanitarian organization professing to
alleviate suffering be an accomplice of a system which so obviously violates this
fundamental principle?”253 Humanitarian aid was the only thing allowing the old
genocidal regime to stay alive. Dominique Martin, MSF director in Paris, saw this
as a “systemic problem,” and thought it was imperative to question “the logic of
the system where the populations are used by their ‘shepherds’ for political ends.
They serve as hostages, bait for international aid which permits the refugee
leaders to build up their political strength.”254 It was impossible to predict the
consequence of militarized camps, but it seemed like positive outcomes were
unlikely.
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MSF-France asked “Did their actions just perpetuate the insecurity,
providing shelter and resources to militants who destabilized the region and
creating a population of ‘well-fed dead’ who were at the mercy of the militants
and ADFL?”255 On October 28, 1994, the MSF-France Board voted to withdraw
from all refugee camps in Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania over the next two
months.256 MSF-Belgium and MSF-Holland continued operating in the Zaire and
Tanzania camps until the end of 1995. They withdrew after the new Kagame
regime in Rwanda infiltrated and killed a whole camp near Kibeho. The camp
included Hutu activists, along with many innocents, and UN and other aid
workers just watched it happen.257

Analysis of Responses
The responses of the ICRC, UNHCR, and MSF to the challenges of the
Rwandan refugee crisis demonstrate the difficulty of adhering to principles in the
face of contextual demands. Returning to Barnett’s question about “how does
neutrality help the victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide,” it is clear that in
Rwanda, neutrality was not enough to neutralize the situation.258 Even when
organizations like MSF France seemingly stuck to their principles by
withdrawing, an unsettled feeling remained for many in the organization because
they felt MSF’s actions were less than ideal.
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The Rwandan refugee camps are a case study of how the difficulty of
acting on principles relates to relationships between actors in the humanitarian
sector and problematic aspects of competition. Humanitarians’ interactions with
donors, local actors, and aid recipients constrained the assistance. Meanwhile,
competition between organizations reduced reflection about impact and
negotiation power. While some Rwandans received life-saving assistance from
humanitarians, this confluence of institutional factors made it very unclear
whether the humanitarians actually did more good than harm.
Donors constrained action, defining where and how refugees received aid.
If donors did not want to take political action or provide security, then
humanitarian actors operated on the ground without them. The Joint Evaluation of
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, a synthesis report with OECD, EU, ICRC, and
NGO representatives, concluded that, the “Rwanda case demonstrates the need for
much closer linkages between humanitarian and political policies in the principal
donor countries and the UN system and also with the neighboring countries and
regional bodies.”259 The clash of ideals and goals between actors forced to interact
led to poor outcomes. Disagreements within and between organizations
exacerbated the moral hazard of principal-agent relationships. The aggressive
internal debates at the UN and MSF, in particular, meant that agents on the
ground had different interests than principals providing direction. This took the
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form of public statements that misrepresented agents’ views on-the-ground and a
lack of support for what agents felt was needed in terms of resources and security.
Additionally, the diversion of aid and misuse by recipients was another instance
of moral hazard in a principal-agent relationship, as donors did not intend their
money to support war criminals or proliferation of violence.
Additionally, media influence and fund availability increased the number
of organizations in the region, decreasing each individual organization’s political
bargaining power and increasing challenges for the entire sector. The Joint
Evaluation found that the Great Lakes refugee crisis “involved an unprecedented
number of agencies and organizations and this must have - increased overall costs
and the difficulties of ensuring a coordinated response.”260 The report went on to
state that the high number of NGO “reflects not only a genuine and widespread
desire to provide assistance but also the reality that participation in large scale,
high profile relief operations has become an important factor in the formation and
development [for] NGOs.”261 Combining the CNN effect, the landing-strip effect,
and large amounts of money attracted many NGOs to the crisis – even if they
were ill equipped or unnecessary. These demands strained coordination by
UNHCR and the ICRC. The sheer number of organizations and competitiveness
also meant NGOs had less negotiating power with donors and local actors. When
multiple organizations threatened to leave due to camp violence, the former Hutu
leaders increased camp safety but only marginally, knowing that more NGOs
would always come. When MSF left Zaire and Tanzania, there were many NGOs
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willing to take their contracts. Further, MSF’s decision to leave strained its
relationship with UNHCR and the UN was hesitant to offer major contracts to
MSF for the next several years.262 Less powerful organizations would have been
financially unable to survive if they made a similar decision. A competitive
environment meant local actors could more easily manipulate aid, as many
resources were available and organizations were eager to be in good favor with
local powers. Lastly, it was even more challenging to adhere to principles in such
an environment, as organizations could not avoid working with one another even
if they disagreed with the varied approaches. An aid organization that openly
associated with former Hutu government leaders could taint the perception of aid
more generally.
The large number of humanitarian agencies and highly disorganized
response meant the accountability and information-sharing mechanisms were
inadequate. The Joint Evaluation report found there was “remarkable variation in
the amount and quality of information on the situation in a given area depending
on the agencies.”263 Security information and reports on assistance quality varied,
reducing the ability of UNHCR to adequately promote repatriation and causing
additional insecurity throughout the camps. Further, the report also noted that it
was “was struck by the very limited attempts by agencies to obtain the views of
beneficiaries on the assistance they were provided with,” demonstrating that when
contracts are competitive, donors and local powers matter more than recipients.264
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Even when organizations tried to collect evaluations on programs, they were often
incomplete or biased. The same report states, “a potentially more disturbing
problem is that in a context of increased concern for profile by, and competition
between, humanitarian agencies, the objectivity of their reporting may suffer as a
result of their emphasis on the positive aspects of their programmes and playing
down of the negative.”265
Imperfect information, lack of effective evaluation, and broken feedback
loops were all factors that reduced the positive impact of humanitarian aid in the
post-Rwandan genocide crisis of the Great Lakes region. Further, the demands of
donors and local actors constrained humanitarian actors and forced them into a
lose-lose situation caught between providing aid to génocidaires in an
increasingly unsafe environment and not providing aid at all. This combination of
factors soured the effects of competition in the humanitarian sector.

Conclusion
In the end, the Rwandan army destroyed all the refugee camps and most
humanitarians immediately abandoned the camps. People fled across the
surrounding area, going on to form militia groups and deep tensions that continue
to terrorize people across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi,
Rwanda, and Tanzania. Although there was little room for humanitarian
organizations to maneuver, their actions ultimately helped feed into regional
instability.
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counterproductive competition all made the situation worse. The use of
humanitarianism in the place of politics had devastating consequences in the
Great Lakes region.
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Chapter V: Background on Afghanistan
Introduction
Afghanistan has faced continual conflict and upheaval since the Soviet
invasion of 1979. As a result, humanitarian actors have maintained a presence in
the country throughout the past three decades. To examine the post-9/11 complex
emergency environment that is the case study for this paper, it is necessary to first
understand the preceding political and humanitarian situation.
Prior to 9/11 Afghanistan
In 1978, a communist coup d’état led Afghanistan into years of conflict
and foreign intervention. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979 to
support the communist regime, sparking a proxy war between the USSR and the
US that increased Afghanistan’s international significance.266 The US funded the
mujahedeen, a loose opposition group to the communist agenda, channeling
money through Pakistan and the CIA. Even though the group included radical
Islamists, the US government continued to support them. During the ensuing
nine-year conflict between superpowers, it is estimated that at least $10 billion
was spent in financial and military expenditures.267 Around 2 million people died
and thousands were displaced to nearby Pakistan by the war. Refugees became
central to recent Afghan history through this displacement, defining the
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relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan while leaving today ’s population
in constant fluctuation.268 Throughout the 1980s, high levels of mortality due to
the mujahedeen’s fight against the Soviets and a lack of functioning infrastructure
were accompanied by war crimes and human rights abuses. The Soviet Union
finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1992, leaving the country close to collapse.
During this time, the Soviet Union prevented many humanitarian agencies from
providing aid in the country because their efforts clashed with its goals.269
Humanitarian aid organizations, including MSF and UN agencies, sided with the
mujahedeen against the USSR, though some like the ICRC sought to act neutrally
(even though refugee camps were bases for the insurgency).270 Controlling aid
access was a mechanism for power in Afghanistan and this instrumentalization of
humanitarianism during the 1980s set the stage for future humanitarian assistance.
Following this, Afghanistan experienced a period of civil war and
warlordism as state institutions were non-functional. Localized groups headed by
warlords within Afghanistan refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the new
Islamic State of Afghanistan as determined through the Peshawar Accord upon
the USSR’s withdrawal, so the country disintegrated into fighting factions.271 The
conflict worsened as countries such as the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran
funded warring groups. Pakistan and the US, in particular, were controlling the
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Afghan Interim Government through funding, though it lacked capacity to
provide any services.272

Kabul was damaged heavily as different warlords’

militias vied for its control.273 In the midst of this conflict, the Taliban
consolidated political and military power. Formed by a faction of the mujahedeen,
the Taliban emerged as a defender of strict Wahhabi Islam views and declared
themselves as protectors of traditional Afghan culture. They promised to improve
stability, winning the favor of many, especially Afghan refugees living in
Pakistan.
After years of devastating civil war, the Taliban successfully forced all the
remaining warlords out of Kabul in 1996. Wherever they took over, the Taliban
introduced an extreme interpretation of Sharia law, limiting the public roles of
women and enforcing harsh rules. They granted sanctuary to Al Qaeda and its
leader Osama bin Laden, though there were tensions between the two groups.274
For its abuse of human rights and its relationship with Al Qaeda, much of the
international community denounced the Taliban. In 1998, the US conducted
airstrikes against suspected bin Laden bases after Al Qaeda attacked American
embassies in Africa.275 In 1999, the UN initiated an air embargo and financial
sanctions against the Taliban government to persuade them to hand over bin
Laden for trial. Although the Taliban were strong during their reign, they fell
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quickly when the US, working with the Northern Alliance, a collection of Afghan
warlords, invaded in October 2001 after the 9/11 attacks of Al Qaeda.
Throughout the civil war and Taliban-control periods, various
international and domestic actors attempted to wield influence in Afghanistan,
each with implications for the provision of aid. These included regional actors,
especially Pakistan, and non-state actors such as warlords and drug lords.276 Nonstate actors enjoyed a monopoly on violence over certain regions of Afghanistan,
meaning they could deny or allow aid access as they preferred. They took
advantage of aid politically and economically through conditionality, thievery,
and abuse.277 For example, the Taliban placed many restrictions on aid groups
such as determining who could get aid and separating men from women in public
spaces. Additionally, they would direct where aid went and sometimes would
seize aid supplies.278 As a result, the international community increased its
rhetoric of human rights promotion and some donors encouraged conditional aid
based on human rights improvement due to concerns about the Taliban’s
oppressive rule. Besides this incorporation of human rights, humanitarian
agencies received little direction from donors regarding how to use resources. Aid
budgets were relatively small so donors were more willing to take risks.279 Yet,
even early on, NGOs could tell that humanitarian resources in such a fragile
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environment held a lot of power because institutions were lacking and provision
of social services was desperately needed.280
In addition to the trauma of its longstanding internal war, Afghanistan
suffered from a series of natural disasters. In 1999, drought left 3.8 million people
close to starvation. In 2001, the UNDP ranked Afghanistan as the second to worst
country to live in the world.281 The situation for women and children was
particularly dire, as the Taliban’s harsh restrictions meant women could not
receive medical care they needed and maternal and child mortality rates were
high, mostly from preventable causes. For example, in 2000, there were around
1,100 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births.282 Furthermore, in 2001, 3.6
million Afghans were considered refugees, while 600,000 were IDPs.283
Role of Humanitarian Actors
Humanitarian organizations have been critical in Afghanistan, effectively
substituting for state capacity throughout the 1990s. The presence of the ICRC,
MSF, and the UN leading up to 2001 defined and constrained the organizations
after 9/11. During most of the Cold War, the ICRC did not operate a field office
in Afghanistan and established its office in Kabul in 1987.284 The Soviets did not
allow humanitarian actors into the country, so the ICRC and other organizations
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were barred.285 Instead, the ICRC served Afghan refugees in Pakistan, with all
their aid stopping at the border. When the Soviet Union began withdrawal, the
ICRC established operations in Afghanistan and ran a number of hospitals, while
supplying medical equipment and personnel to facilities across the country. It
attempted to administer aid to people on all sides of the conflict, adhering to the
principles of neutrality and impartiality. Beyond its medical services, the ICRC
provided nutritional surveillance, sanitation programs, worked with detainees, and
connected prisoners with their families.286 The ICRC also worked with
commanders of various militias and groups to negotiate ceasefires throughout the
1990s, though these usually collapsed within days.287
The ICRC continued to emphasize the importance of international
humanitarian law. They repeatedly appealed for all parties to the 1990s conflict to
respect the Geneva Conventions. When the Taliban took control of Kabul and
prohibited women from many public spaces, most international organizations
were outraged. However, the ICRC sought “innovative solutions in harmony with
local customs, while at the same time endeavoring to sensitize the Taliban
leadership to the problem with the aim of bringing about a more flexible
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government

policy.”288

The

organization

sought

to

emphasize

neutrality/impartiality in working with the Taliban, while also subtly suggesting
they change their policies. Even when the Taliban instituted a harmful womenonly medical facility, the ICRC did not suspend its activities, arguing that
continuing to operate was more important. By holding its ground, the ICRC
continued providing care to men and women and sparked a slight change in
Taliban policies.289 Olivier Durr, then-Head of the ICRC Delegation articulated
that beyond the challenges of working with the Taliban, the ICRC also faced
security issues and struggled to balance its principles while maintaining
funding.290 Working in Afghanistan throughout the late 20th century pushed “the
ICRC to juggle many competing humanitarian priorities with limited resources
while working in a situation unparalleled in the rest of the world.”291
The UN had a largely political role in Afghanistan throughout the 20th
century; for example, the General Assembly passed a resolution in 1980 calling
the Soviets’ armed intervention of Afghanistan deplorable and requesting the
removal of foreign troops.292 Although the UN was largely unable to provide
humanitarian aid within Afghanistan except through cross-border operations, it
adopted a series of resolutions against the Cold War conflict. During this time,
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UNHCR conducted its largest operation of the decade, managing Afghan refugees
in Pakistan.293 As Afghanistan remained unstable, UNHCR continued to oversee
refugee issues and population flows in Pakistan. The UN’s inability to secure the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and repatriate refugees given the political climate
added to continual domestic upheaval.294 By 1987, the UN began intense efforts
to coordinate humanitarian aid within Afghanistan, expressing concern for its lack
of development. The UN provided assistance through various agencies, including
UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, and WFP. The interim government determined by the
Peshawar Accord was ineffectual so the UN took the role of providing basic
services.295 The UN also encouraged development of Afghan NGOs, but this
ended up having negative consequences, as there was little way to ensure quality
with a proliferation of inexperienced organizations.296 In 1993, the SecretaryGeneral established the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan
(UNSMA) to better plan reconstruction of the country, but the Taliban’s
consolidation of power made this ineffective. The UN also had a hard time raising
necessary funds to distribute - for example, the 1995-96 appeal only raised 50
percent of the amount deemed urgent.297
In 1997, the UN formed a Strategic Framework to coordinate
humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, relying on the idea that connecting
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politics, assistance, and human rights would increase effectiveness.298 However,
many organizations claimed that this Framework compromised humanitarian aid
because it combined all aid under one umbrella. The lack of buy-in from various
NGOs meant coordination was low and, in early 2001, the World Bank released a
conclusion that the Strategic Framework was ineffectual.299 There had also been
no direct budget to support coordination, adding to the failure. Overall, despite the
UN’s continual presence in Afghanistan, there was little progress from 1980 to
2001.
MSF condemned the Soviet Union’s actions in Afghanistan during the
Cold War, instead working with the Afghan resistance, despite the fact that
“relations with the mujahedeen gave [them] infinitely more trouble than the Red
Army,” according to the then-mission organizer Juliette Fournot.300 MSF was
against communism, meaning it was also anti-Soviet, and bore witness to the
massive bombing and use of mines against the Afghan people by the Soviets.
Claude Malhuret, co-founder of MSF, travelled to the US during this time to
contribute to the fight against communism and the organization received several
rounds of funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).301 MSF
was based in Pakistan, but ran cross-border programs to equip twelve hospitals
throughout Afghanistan. It faced security trouble as Soviet planes often targeted
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their hospitals.302 The organization provided medical services throughout this
period, while also attempting to draw public attention to the war and condemning
communism.
After the Soviet Union’s presence decreased, US funds led to infighting
between resistance groups due to resource differences and tensions between MSF
and the mujahedeen resulted.303 In 1990, escalation led to the murder of an MSF
expatriate in a clinic in Badakhshan and MSF immediately closed all of its
programs throughout the country. MSF returned in 1992, after the official
withdrawal of the Soviet Union, to address the all-out civil war that ensued. MSF
was able to improve its reputation and acceptance in the country through a large,
effective operation with multiple MSF sections across Afghanistan.304 However,
after the Taliban took control and forced NGOs to submit to harsh requirements
and random aid seizures, unease among MSF staff grew regarding their operations
in Afghanistan. Additionally, MSF criticized the UN’s Strategic Framework
developed in 1997, saying that it compromised humanitarian assistance.305
Some say that “pure” humanitarian action never really existed in
Afghanistan, as NGOs provided aid to mujahedeen fighters in the 1980s,
supported militant refugee camps in Pakistan, and took money from the US
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during the Soviet invasion.306 All of these were political choices. Additionally, the
annual spending of around $200 million in Afghanistan for humanitarian relief
each year meant that the country relied on aid, assuming it would come every year
in the absence of other infrastructure, even though it never met total need.307 Prior
to 2001, the humanitarian aid community in Afghanistan was defined by a
combination of constant presence, lack of effectiveness, and inability to surmount
political challenges. The OECD described the aid effort in Afghanistan at this
point as extremely confused:
As a matter of principle, the aid community wants the
Taliban...to respect international norms while at the same time it
wants to respect Afghan culture and tradition. As a matter of
principle, the aid community wants its aid to be only
humanitarian, yet conditional in respecting human rights, while
also upholding the right to humanitarian assistance.308
The challenges for the humanitarian assistance community did not stop with the
US invasion of 2001, rather operations remained precarious and principles were
compromised.
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Post 9/11 Complex Emergency
On September 11, 2001, two planes crashed into the World Trade Center
in the United States, sparking the Global War on Terror. The US launched
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 with the goals of
dismantling Al Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power. The war in
Afghanistan made a bad humanitarian situation worse. In response to US
invasion, the Taliban declared that they could no longer guarantee safety of aid
workers and began to shut down aid communication channels and confiscate
supplies.309 The UN estimated that at least 5 million people were in dire need in
October, with projections that would grow by 2.5 million by the end of 2001.310
By November 13, the Northern Allied forces took Kabul and by early
December, the last Taliban-controlled city was under the control of anti-Taliban
troops supported by the US. A political agreement was brokered in Bonn,
Germany to form an interim government and launch state-building measures. This
included stipulations for development of a constitution and elections that would
eventually lead to Hamid Karzai becoming president in 2004. As part of the
easing of hostilities, the US launched the Immediate and Transitional Assistance
Program for the Afghan People in January 2002 to provide emergency relief.
However, fighting continued, and there were attacks by both the Taliban and Al
Qaeda throughout the next several years. Very few people in Afghanistan were
unaffected by the series of armed conflict. Around 60 percent had direct
experience (meaning they had to leave homes, suffered serious property damage,
309
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lost contact with a close relative, lost their means of income, or their property
came under enemy control), while an additional 36 percent of Afghans either
dealt with limited water/electricity or healthcare.311 By 2004, the Taliban
increasingly asserted itself and increased its kidnapping and murders of aid
workers. More than 30 aid workers died that year at the hands of the Taliban.312
Aid workers were targeted based on their association with the West. This
confluence of factors made the situation in Afghanistan particularly precarious.
Humanitarian actors tried to respond to the high numbers of IDPs, terrible public
health problems, and food insecurity in the midst of a war, while being both
funded and targeted by belligerents.
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Chapter VI: Post 9/11 Afghanistan Case Study
Introduction
As described in the previous chapter, Afghanistan experienced around 20
years of turmoil leading up to the US invasion of October 2001. Humanitarian
actors were already present in Afghanistan with reputations that would shift with
the politicization and militarization that ensued. This chapter focuses on
humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan after October 2001. To begin, it details the
emergency-specific goals and principles of the ICRC, UN, and MSF, before
explaining various difficulties of working in Afghanistan. This chapter describes
the responses of the ICRC, UN, and MSF to these challenges and then analyzes
them in the context of humanitarian sector constraints.
Humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan was coopted for military and
political missions during the early 2000s. As a result, impartiality and neutrality
were compromised and the region became increasingly unsafe for humanitarians.
A large number of organizations present in Afghanistan further complicated this
issue as agencies competed for funding and attention. The absence of effective
evaluation tools meant donors and local communities were unable to fully grasp
aid’s effects. As David Rieff put it, the confluence of these challenges, meant that
“if there was anything left of the idea of an autonomous humanitarianism, it was
all but put out of its misery in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001.”313
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Organization Goals
ICRC Mission/Goals
The ICRC publicly affirmed its principles regarding impartiality,
neutrality, and IHL from the outset of the conflict in 2001. Its first press release
after the US invasion reminded all involved parties “of their obligation to respect
and ensure respect for international humanitarian law.”314 In the same press
release, the ICRC reaffirmed its neutral stance and reminded parties to the conflict
that they “must authorize and facilitate impartial humanitarian relief operations
and ensure the safety of medical and humanitarian personnel.”315 It should be
noted that the ICRC never claimed that IHL protects humanitarian actors that are
not impartial or that it extends to development assistance. Instead, the ICRC
repeated the idea that impartiality is key to its operations and to the success of any
humanitarian operations.
Additionally, the ICRC went on to release a follow-up statement in
November regarding its independent role. The ICRC highlighted the importance
of work done by local Afghan ICRC staff, rejecting notions that “humanitarian
work can only be carried out when the ‘victors’ have arrived, or worse, in the
minds of some people or sectors of the media, when the ‘good party’ has taken
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control.”316 The same statement also emphasized that “non-partisan, independent,
and impartial humanitarian action must be possible,” regardless of which parties
have local power, and that effectiveness of assistance can and should only be
assessed on a “factual basis.”317 The ICRC wanted to be a symbol of humanitarian
independence and neutrality, drawing upon its historical presence in Afghanistan
as evidence of its ability to continue doing so into the 21st century.

UN Mission/Goals
The UN’s humanitarian involvement in Afghanistan was multi-faceted,
involving UNHCR, WFP, and UNOCHA. The UN also had development and
security components in-country during the early 2000s. After the escalation of
conflict from the US invasion, the UNSC expressed its support for the Taliban
regime to be overthrown and condemned Afghanistan’s use as a haven for
terrorists.318 The UN attempted to promote dialogue between various parties to the
conflict, including facilitation of the Bonn Agreement in late 2001. This political
role demonstrated a process of taking sides, as the UN explicitly promoted the
Karzai government as legitimate.319 From the outset, the UN bolstered the idea of
winners and losers in Afghanistan, pushing all NGOs to work with the new
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government. For many, this “broke the social contract of acceptance that normally
allows humanitarian agencies to operate in volatile environments.”320
Regarding the UN’s humanitarian goals, Kofi Annan, the then-Secretary
General, wanted humanitarian assistance in coordination with human rights
promotion and the US/NATO forces in Afghanistan.321 In doing so, he established
the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2002 under
UNSC resolution 1401 for “UNAMA and the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative for Afghanistan (SRSG) to continue leading and coordinating
international civilian efforts in assisting Afghanistan.”322 Under this system,
humanitarian assistance was subordinate to political goals because UNAMA
mainly focused on supporting the new Afghan government’s peace process. As
these were the top-down goals of the UN, agencies like WFP and UNHCR
struggled to balance their humanitarian obligations. These branches were
concerned about the crossover between politics and assistance, presuming that
political and military involvement would worsen the situation. Stephanie Bunker,
spokeswoman for the UN Afghan programs expressed such fears in late 2001:
The Afghans simply can’t cope [with the implications of the US
invasion]. With WFP unable to bring in food, with foreign relief
workers forced out and programs curtailed, we could be looking at
something unimaginable in the next few months. And winter is
coming. The question is, ‘How are the people in Afghanistan going
to survive this?’ We’re all well aware that so much more could be
done. But what we are doing is saving lives, every day in
Afghanistan, and that’s what is at risk now.323
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Individuals like Bunker advocated for separation between politics and
humanitarianism to ensure impartiality would guarantee access, but this proved
impossible. Tensions between the political goals of reconstruction and the
humanitarian imperative to help the needy clashed within the UN from the start of
its provision of aid to Afghanistan after 9/11.

MSF Mission/Goals
MSF did not initially condemn the US invasion of Afghanistan, as it was
endorsed by the UN in the name of self-defense, and “the role of a humanitarian
agency is not to judge the reasons or objectives of war, but rather the means to
carry it out.”324 MSF reduced its humanitarian operations during the heavy US
bombing of October, but resumed immediately after the fall of the Taliban
government in November 2001. At this point, MSF publicly criticized the US
attempt to combine food drops with bombs, which represented the mixture of
humanitarian aid with military goals. MSF worried that “if the military are
involved in delivering humanitarian assistance, it can be regarded by their
opponents as an act of war: aid and aid workers can be legitimately targeted and
so denied to people in need.”325 MSF repeated the notion that humanitarian war
was a contradiction, not a solution to the problems of Afghanistan.326 Brauman,
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MSF’s co-founder, further argued that subordination of humanitarianism to
reasons of state, even if they were good, was a “dangerous regression.”327
As such, MSF recommended a large-scale humanitarian relief effort, fully
independent from belligerents, aimed at reaching the most vulnerable populations
throughout Afghanistan. Like the ICRC, MSF stressed the importance of
independence and impartiality for humanitarian actors in Afghanistan and
attempted to distance itself from politics and military involvement.

Challenges
Donor Pressures
The newly declared Global War on Terror complicated the relationships
between donors and humanitarian agencies operating in Afghanistan. The
principle of coherence in aid was promoted by donors, yet this was “the code
word for the integration of humanitarian action into the wider political designs of
donors, the UN, and of the UN-mandated military coalition operating in
Afghanistan since late 2001.”328 Most of the funding for humanitarian assistance
in Afghanistan came from the West, including belligerent states such as the US
and Great Britain. In fact, all of the top aid donors to Afghanistan, except
Switzerland and India, were belligerents to the conflict - an unprecedented
situation.329 Humanitarian actors were placed in a position where donors were
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also responsible for killing civilians, raising issues of credibility. To make matters
worse, Afghanistan was a “laboratory” for various “military/political/assistance
hybrids” where humanitarian assistance was delivered with or by military
forces.330 Since donors have financial control over humanitarian agencies, NGOs
had little choice but to bend to state interests.331 Belligerent parties and NATO
were guided by the counterinsurgency concept (COIN) and this directed where
they supported aid rather than urgency of need.332 Additionally, the situation in
Afghanistan was largely painted as a security issue where humanitarian
organizations had little say about fund allocation.333 Donor logic was that military
and security objectives would be bolstered by providing aid, in order to increase
stability and win local allies.334 Yet, to do this, political objectives were combined
with humanitarianism and neutrality/impartiality were understood as hindrances
to efficiency.
In particular, money from the US, one of the largest funders for
humanitarian assistance, was tied to military and political agendas. This agenda
involved the war against terrorism, geopolitical/economic goals, a project to end a
tyrannical regime, improve humanitarian conditions, and create democratic
institutions.335 George W. Bush’s division of the world into those with us and
against us meant that organizations were forbidden to provide services, personnel,
330
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and training to terrorist organizations or individuals related to terrorist
organizations.336 These vague requirements were challenging for NGOs to
navigate. Additionally, there was an increase in aid funds controlled by the US
military since 9/11, further blurring the lines between military and humanitarian
activities.337
Colin Powell is known for calling humanitarian NGOs a “force
multiplier,” for the US military in Afghanistan.338 The US military also provided
humanitarian aid itself, as part of their “hearts and minds” operation. This had
limited success; the US military is infamous for dropping food and bombs at the
same time where the yellow packaging of food was hard to distinguish from the
yellow of unexploded cluster munitions.339 The US also launched Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across Afghanistan to conduct humanitarian
reconstruction projects, consisting of soldiers, aid personnel, and civil affairs
officers. PRTs provided conditional aid, dependent on the strategic value of
certain areas and whether communities would provide intelligence for finding
insurgents.340 PRTs were often confused with humanitarian agency workers
separate from the US military, as they provided similar services (along with
security and reconstruction assistance). Also, the increasing reliance of the US
military on humanitarian action was complicated, as there are different cultures
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and assumptions between humanitarians and the military.341 Humanitarians
emphasize neutrality, independence, and impartiality but these are contrary to
military values. Military involvement in humanitarianism through PRTs and other
mechanisms compromised these values.
Funders determined the type of assistance provided to Afghans. Donor
preference for high-profile aid efforts meant a large portion of funds went towards
food aid. Food was a common tool for donors to win good favor, so food and
bombs appeared simultaneously to make belligerents look better. Prior to the US
invasion, less than 600 metric tons was available in food aid per month. By
January 2002, over 3000 metric tons per month was provided to Afghanistan and
this remained high for the next year.342
Donor resources were scarce overall, meaning humanitarian organizations
had to compete for funds.343 Funding was not definite for NGOs despite the initial
attention on Afghanistan. Many private donors lost money due to stock changes
post 9/11, reducing overall contributions.344 Donor governments also felt the
financial impact of 9/11. Further, as the turmoil in Afghanistan drew on, interest
in the country decreased and funding followed suit. Resources were increasingly
provided only through contracts, rather than grants, which meant that donors had
more influence over humanitarian agencies.345 As a result, organizations made
hard decisions about where to use limited unrestricted funds and spent more time
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raising discretionary funds for organizational needs when donors did not cover
them through contracts. In Afghanistan, the lack of resources made it extremely
challenging for organizations to say no to donors and some donors even tried to
incite competition because they thought it would lead to better outcomes.346 In
these cases, humanitarians had no choice but to play into the system.
Overall, donors were relatively intolerant of NGO complaints regarding
the politicization and militarization of humanitarian assistance, instead promoting
coherence between politics, military objectives, and humanitarianism in
Afghanistan.347 For example, German Development Minister Dirk Niebel
complained that NGOs “want[ed] to maintain a certain difference from the
Bundeswehr,” the German armed forces, and said that if they did not want to
cooperate with the military then “they need[ed] to look for other donors.”348 Highlevel officials at USAID made the same sentiment clear. William Frej, head of
USAID mission to Afghanistan, said, “without COIN and without the military’s
support, many of the humanitarian agencies...would not be able to enter the areas
once controlled by insurgents,” implying they should be grateful.349 Andrew
Natsios, a USAID administrator, thought that humanitarian aid should be in
service of US foreign policy and that concerns regarding autonomous
humanitarian space were unfounded.350
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Media Influence
After 9/11, the threat of violence from terrorists dominated the media and
initially Afghanistan received a lot of international attention.351 The media
focused on the war narrative, in terms of how many were killed and how, rather
than the humanitarian needs of Afghans. Additionally, the media provided
imagery of executions and suicide bombings that demonstrated the complete
disregard for IHL by involved parties. These images seemed to suggest that
humanitarian assistance and IHL were obsolete in Afghanistan, making the issue
more security and terrorism focused.352
International perceptions of the conflict in Afghanistan were extremely
important to donors and belligerent states like the US. There was an
“imperative...of being seen as doing something besides killing people,” which
meant that the US wanted images of American humanitarianism broadcast across
the world.353 This often involved moralizing rhetoric in press releases or
government statements in order to further justify military intervention.354 For
example, the US continually emphasized its commitment to “helping Afghans
create a country that is prosperous, democratic, at peace within itself and with its
neighbors, possessing a free market and respectful of human rights,” in the
media.355
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Non-State Actor Relations
Going beyond the international donors and new Afghan government,
humanitarian agencies also had to navigate relations with non-state actors such as
insurgent groups, warlords, drug lords, and community leaders. The shared goals
and funding between political, military, and humanitarian actors meant that
“conceptual confusion and security challenges,” were prevalent among non-state
actors.356
In particular, the Taliban and Al Qaeda (including its affiliates) set up a
conflict between the West and Islam, equating humanitarian agencies with the
military presence. Insurgency groups viewed the assistance community as part of
the “Western conspiracy” because they were “deeply embedded financially,
politically, and culturally in the West,” shifting their status from “benign infidels
to agents of Western imperialism.”357 This was complicated because
humanitarians try to avoid engaging terrorists, as doing so would confer
legitimacy. Yet, even lesser insurgents have similar tactic and aims so they could
not be negotiated with either.358 Although humanitarian organizations had
legitimate reasons to not engage Al Qaeda and similar splinter groups, not doing
so increased the perception that they were agents of the West.
Tensions with local powers intensified due to cultural differences between
aid workers and local communities. For example, attitudes regarding alcohol, sex,
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and gender roles differed greatly between Afghans and foreign humanitarians.359
One NGO security director explained that most organizations held parties on the
weekends, which often led to security incidents based on these strains.360 Local
populations also complained about unsafe driving habits of aid workers. A lack of
overall sensitivity increased local resentment of humanitarian assistance, making
it even more challenging to gain access to certain regions in need of aid.
Humanitarian access to various parts of Afghanistan shrunk overall
throughout the early 2000s due to security risks. In particular, the UN placed
many movement restrictions upon its staff.361 Programs had to be managed by
remote control from safer areas, reinforcing the perception that humanitarian
organizations were taking sides because they were established in enclaves
controlled by the new government.362 This just aggravated the perceptions of side
taking that initially created tension. As described by Antonio Donini, who served
as Director of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to
Afghanistan from 1999-2002:
The aid community suffered from the confusion faced by ordinary
Afghans, not to mention the armed opposition, in distinguishing
humanitarians from other aid and political actors. The perception
that the aid enterprise had taken sides was of course reinforced by
the fact that aid agencies were only present in increasingly
securitized compounds in government-held towns.363
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Additionally, long-term relationships with communities fractured because
senior staff could not visit project activities. This also diminished project quality;
in particular, quality and access of health services declined for many throughout
the 2000s. Monitoring and evaluation of programs was negatively impacted, as
aid agencies increasingly relied on remote partners to help with reporting which
often led to overly simplified or politicized assessments.364 Perception issues took
another form when neutral NGOs could sometimes be perceived as providing aid
to enemies to the US coalition. This issue directly harmed Afghan citizens
because coalition forces sometimes attacked NGO clinics perceived as harboring
insurgents.365 This increased wariness among communities to accept aid. Overall,
gaining access to certain areas of Afghanistan was not guaranteed and
humanitarian organizations faced serious dilemmas when interacting with nonstate actors.

Economy of Aid
Throughout the early 2000s, the economics of warfare and aid influenced
the level of security and development in Afghanistan. An illicit drug trade
flourished throughout the country, leftover from the rampant warlordism of the
1990s.366 Drug economies behind war are incredibly resilient, able to thrive off
instability and a lack of government infrastructure. Drug lords had the power to
take advantage of aid economically, through denial of access, egress,
364
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conditionality, thievery, and general abuse.367 For example, due to the
proliferation of food aid after 2001, drug lords and warlords could easily gather
and hoard food provisions.368 These non-state actors saw humanitarian aid as an
asset to their operations, which harmed humanitarian actors and increased
instability in aid delivery.
The new government of Afghanistan also had an interest in profiting from
humanitarian aid and was therefore angered by a perception that aid organizations
had economic agendas to benefit from Afghanistan, rather than humanitarian
goals. This increased tensions with both the government and local communities in
Afghanistan. For example, Bashar Dost, the Planning Minister under Karzai,
lamented in 2005, “I have yet to see an NGO that has spent 80 percent of its
money for the benefit of the Afghans and 20 percent for their own benefit.
International NGOs get big amounts of money from their own nations just by
showing them sensitive pictures and videos of Afghan people, and there are even
some individuals who give all their salaries to NGOs to spend it on charity here,
but NGOs spend all their money on themselves.”369 Many thought that NGOs had
decreased in usefulness since 1992.370 This view of NGOs led the Karzai
government to attempt to reduce the number of NGOs in Afghanistan, citing
ineffectiveness and waste of money. Wastefulness was embodied in the image of
the white Land Cruiser, as Afghans questioned why aid workers used such
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expensive vehicles. These sentiments motivated the Karzai government’s
preference for private contractors who had to pay taxes, rather than humanitarian
NGOs, for providing social services.371 Many for-profit companies entered the
market for humanitarian services, especially in areas of communication, transport,
and logistics and they were perceived as more effective than NGOs.372 This meant
that humanitarian organizations not only competed amongst each other for
humanitarian space and access in Afghanistan, but also with for-profit, private
contractors who were often favored by the Karzai government due to the
unfavorable impressions of NGOs and desire for taxation.

Security Issues
In dealing with the US force, the Northern Alliance, the Taliban, Al
Qaeda, and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan, many security issues resulted
for Afghan civilians and for humanitarian organizations. In 2001 alone, over
2,300 Afghan civilians were killed and by 2014, this number topped 26,000.373
High security risks led many to believe that the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan
was only a security issue, leading to calls by donors for more military without
“scrutiny of the ramifications.”374 Complex humanitarian emergencies often have
security elements, but the use of militaries alongside humanitarians was unique in
Afghanistan, as it involved explicit insertion of “soldiers into humanitarian
371
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operations and aid workers into military operations.”375 Although there were
legitimate security needs in Afghanistan throughout the 2000s, the militarization
of humanitarianism worsened the situation.
Many humanitarian organizations feared cooperation with military
intervention because it increasingly made them a target of violence. These fears
were not unfounded; around 24 aid workers were killed in 2004 alone.376 In total,
according to the Aid Security Database since 2001, over 1000 aid workers have
been targets of violence and kidnappings in Afghanistan.377 This problem was
intensified by the relationships between aid and donors/conflict belligerents as
discussed earlier. For example, a report released by CARE and the World Bank
found that Afghan schools perceived as being supported by US-funded PRTs
were at a higher risk of being attacked than other educational institutions.378 This
increase in targeting of aid workers in Afghanistan made it more challenging for
organizations to access people in need.
In order to continue working in Afghanistan, many humanitarian
organizations increased their security budgets and considered ways to make aid
safer.379 This was often done through private military companies. Privatization of
security raised issues of accountability, commodification, and the long-term
effects of private security contractors.380 For example, do private military services
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have to adhere to IHL and the Geneva Conventions? Most companies do not
consider themselves bound to these laws, but humanitarian organizations actively
promote them. Privatization of security in Afghanistan raised questions of who
gains from aid, as “utilizing actors with ulterior motives - that is, profit - can
distort operations, alienate victims, and undermine the reputation of
humanitarians.”381 The security challenges in Afghanistan forced humanitarian
organizations to face tensions between expediency/efficiency and ethics. It was
nearly impossible for organizations to operate in a hostile environment without
security, but this also compromised them.

Organization Responses
ICRC Response
After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the ICRC attempted to maintain
relationships with all the involved belligerents, emphasizing the organization’s
impartiality. To do this, the ICRC cared for wounded combatants, regardless of
their affiliation, facilitated repatriation of mortal remains, and provided contacts
between families and detainees in Bagram and Guantanamo.382 Such actions
allowed the ICRC to develop trust with various insurgent groups in Afghanistan
that other humanitarian organizations did not have. Additionally, the ICRC
avoided remote project management when possible, which helped them maintain
project quality and relationships with local communities.383 The WHO actually
381
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implemented one of its vaccination campaigns through the ICRC because the UN
lacked access to the whole country, but the ICRC was able to facilitate it.384
Despite efforts to maintain impartiality and neutrality, the ICRC did not
escape the label of the Western conspiracy placed on humanitarians in
Afghanistan. In fact, it was one of the first organizations to have its workers
deliberately killed.385 In 2003, Ricardo Munguia, a Swiss ICRC Delegate, was
shot by assailants who stopped his car and then warned accompanying Afghans to
not work for foreigners.386 This shocking event led the ICRC to briefly suspend
operations before it tried to re-establish its historically strong relationship with
insurgents, but it faced challenges and continued to lose staff to violence. To
address this, the ICRC hired many local workers, assuming they would be
targeted less than foreigners.387 Though this was well-intentioned and helped
protect local capabilities, local staff were sometimes seen as collaborators with
the enemy and were unable to leave the country in the same way that foreigners
could when threatened.
To improve security, the ICRC used private armed escorts for protection at
all times, attempting to do so while maintaining neutrality, impartiality, and
independence.388 It thought that by working with mercenaries, they could demand
adherence to IHL through formal procedures.389 The ICRC thus normalized the
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use of mercenaries in humanitarian practices, but not all organizations were able
to force such private companies to adhere to international law.
Overall, the ICRC was mainly able to resist the political pressures in
Afghanistan and continued supplying critical aid to communities across the
country throughout the 2000s, though it did suffer from security risks and the
deaths of over 40 ICRC staff members between 2001 and the end of 2016.

UN Response
The UN as an organization was complicit with the politicization and
militarization of aid in Afghanistan, as it was fully aligned with one set of
belligerents. From 2001-2011, Afghanistan was the only complex emergency in
which the UN was so politicized, called by some a “failure of mandate and of
leadership.”390 This one-sidedness was demonstrated in many ways. Since the
humanitarian coordinator in Afghanistan also acted as the Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, this meant the same person was in
charge of both impartial humanitarianism and reconstruction/development
planning with the Karzai government. All the UNSC resolutions during this time
supported the US coalition and UNAMA.

Even UNOCHA’s ability to be

principled seemed uncertain, setting the tone for all UN humanitarian assistance.
UNOCHA did not negotiate access with insurgents or advocate for the respect of
humanitarianism in Afghanistan.391 Furthermore, the UN did not take a public
stand against well-documented attacks on minority groups in Afghanistan by
390
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coalition forces in 2002, failing to adhere to principles of protection.392
Additionally, UNOCHA lacked reliable data and did not analyze the humanitarian
caseload as it normally did. These problems meant there was a “failure to put
together a credible picture of the humanitarian implications of the war, rising
insecurity, and lawlessness…[this] fed donor reluctance to acknowledge that a
robust humanitarian response was necessary.”393 This also jeopardized all other
humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan, as it was hard for insurgents
to distinguish them from organizations like the UN that were aligned with the US
coalition.
Many individuals operating within the UN questioned the alignment with
military forces and the failure to maintain an autonomous space for
humanitarians. Various officials criticized Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s
continued support for the US-supported coalition and his welcoming attitude
toward the military surge. Such actions by Annan allowed opposition forces to
point to clear instances that demonstrated the “lack of impartiality of the United
Nations as a whole,” leading to more brutality towards aid workers.394 Individuals
such as Haj-Ibrahim, the UNOCHA lead in Kabul, questioned the military
provision of humanitarian assistance.395 He argued that it may not be the most
effective path of resources and they should separate their purposes. Some UN
officials stated or implied that they thought delivering aid as military strategy
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actually provoked insurgents.396 Also, a combination of current and former UN
officials signed a public letter against the military-humanitarian coalition. These
officials included Sadako Ogata, the former head of UNHCR, and Mark Malloch
Brown, then-head of UNDP who also used to be at UNHCR.397 However, there
was ultimately not enough unified opposition to change the overall strategy.
The UN benefitted from the military support in multiple ways because the
risky environment of Afghanistan meant that security was needed, especially as
humanitarians were increasingly targeted. Such targeting led to the UNSC
adopting resolution 1502 in 2003 to establish that killing aid workers is a war
crime.398 Yet, this offered little real protection and violence against aid workers
did not stop.399 At times, this pushed the UN to “become more risk averse and
loath to rethink [its] modus operandi…[its] universe of responsibility [became]
defined by political and security considerations rather than by acuteness of need
and the humanitarian imperative.”400 In December of 2001, for example, the
UNSC established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the
new government in Afghanistan maintain security.401 With this focus on security,
the UN’s humanitarian branches were allocated less money and often did not meet
their funding goals. By the end of 2001, only $358 million of the $662 million
needed for UN emergency relief programs in Afghanistan was secured.402
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As security concerns grew larger, the UN became increasingly dependent
on the US, which reduced any negotiating power for depoliticizing aid. The WFP
and UNHCR’s “programs in Afghanistan had long been disproportionately
dependent on US government funding,” creating reliance on US cooperation.403
At times the UN relied upon the coalition forces greater capacity than
humanitarians to get things done. For instance, the US military reopened a bridge
from Uzbekistan to the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif to deliver food
aid. Prior to this, the WFP was unable to use this efficient channel to transport
resources, but US support helped it achieve its goals.404 This combination of
reliance upon the US for security, funding, and general support reduced the UN’s
ability to negotiate regarding its general concerns. This impasse meant overall, the
UN did not cohesively respond to the various pressures faced in Afghanistan. As
the UN experienced both benefits and detriments from the politicization and
militarization of aid after 9/11, it was unable to fully adhere to its humanitarian
mandate and deliver necessary assistance.

MSF Response
MSF adhered closely to its principles and goals from the outset of its
involvement in Afghanistan after 9/11, until it eventually decided to withdraw due
to high security threats. Kenny Gluck, MSF Director of Operations at the time,
described their goals in Afghanistan as “want[ing] to be relevant medically and
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irrelevant militarily and politically.”405 MSF rejected the politicization of
humanitarian aid. It saw the US’s drops of bombs and food as “after-sales
service,” that cheapened the true meaning of humanitarianism.406 It did not think
that humanitarian assistance could achieve the lofty diplomatic, economic, and
political goals that donors had in mind. Instead, it insisted that “modest
parameters had to be drawn around what the humanitarian enterprise could
accomplish.”407 For MSF, humanitarianism served victims, not regimes.
Regarding its relationships with local actors, MSF repeatedly announced its
impartial stance and continued to manage local projects on-site when possible.408
This set it apart from traditional agencies, as only the ICRC and MSF maintained
a high level of local community access across Afghanistan. Also, MSF publicly
rejected the expansion of security forces, such as the US and NATO coalition, and
the establishment of ISAF by the UN. MSF condemned the use of humanitarian
aid for military objectives.409 In this way, MSF resisted many of the political
pressures in Afghanistan and asserted its autonomy against partisan agendas.
However, these attempts were not enough, and MSF staff were caught up
in the violence against humanitarian workers in Afghanistan. In June of 2004, five
MSF staff members were killed in a northwestern province.410 Following the
killing, a Taliban spokesperson took responsibility for the murders and said that
405
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MSF works for American interests thus would remain targets for violence.411 For
MSF, this killing was unprecedented and it argued that the political/security
conditions of Afghanistan made it impossible to continue operations. As a result,
MSF decided to close all its programs by the end of August 2004. In a press
conference following this event, MSF reiterated its condemnation of the use of
humanitarian aid for political conditions and emphasized, “humanitarian
assistance is only possible when armed actors respect the safety of humanitarian
workers.”412 MSF had already publicly condemned actions such as the US-led
coalition’s distribution of leaflets conditioning aid upon information sharing and
other such actions to no avail.413 With little hope that conditions would change,
MSF withdrew from Afghanistan and would not resume operations in the country
until 2009. Thus, despite its bold attempts to remain neutral within Afghanistan,
MSF was unable to maintain an impartial image because it was caught up with
other aid organizations and the US military. MSF deliberately wanted to avoid
being seen as complicit with less-principled humanitarian actors, but it was
impossible to do so and thus it could not avoid the deaths of its personnel.
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Analysis of Responses
The actions of the ICRC, UN, and MSF in Afghanistan throughout the
early 2000s vividly illustrate the challenges of the politicization and militarization
of aid. It became nearly impossible for humanitarians to adhere to principles of
neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Even though the ICRC and MSF
arguably had the most power to do so, humanitarianism was not effectively
distinguished from politics and even their staff became targets of violence.
Despite the best attempts of the ICRC and MSF to operate in a principled manner,
other humanitarians that did not share the same values, which irreparably
tarnished them. MSF and ICRC personnel were targeted because the UN and the
US-led military coalition provided humanitarian assistance without principles of
impartiality and independence in place, using aid as a political tool and conflating
it with security operations. A few humanitarian actors with different priorities
can spoil the field for the rest.
Afghanistan demonstrates that principles do matter for humanitarianism,
despite the challenge in maintaining them against political forces. In the short run,
communities may not care whether the ICRC or US military provides aid
supplies, but they do value “the importance of a clinic that is able to function in
the midst of a war zone and appreciate policies that reduce rather than increase the
risks they face.”414 Attaching conditions to life-saving assistance or linking it to
political strategies puts aid at risks and reduced humanitarians’ access to needy
communities. As one anti-governmental tribal leader in Afghanistan said to an
414
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NGO worker, “just as we do not expect you to support our religious, social,
political views and actions, so we expect you not to support - in any way - our
enemies. Know when so-called humanitarianism becomes a sword, or a poison,
and stop there.”415 Violence against humanitarians in Afghanistan is a salient
example of what occurs when principles are broken and aid becomes a sword.
Even providing aid to all regardless of affiliation could have negative effects
alluded to in this leader’s comments. Core humanitarian principles are not a
guarantee of outcomes, rather a prerequisite to negotiate conflict space that still
contains the possibility of negative consequences.
The growth in number of humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan
seemed to worsen the problems of politicization. By December 2004, there were
335 international NGOs and 2300 national NGOs in Afghanistan.416
Improvements in technological capabilities and coordination standards since the
1990s did not protect humanitarianism against dilemmas of competition.417 As a
result, “humanitarian operations in Afghanistan and Iraq represent the most
visible and contentious course of operations to date.”418 There were not enough
total resources available to provide assistance in an ideal manner, meaning that
money was spread thin across many organizations.419 Furthermore, the
proliferation of organizations made it even more challenging for non-state actors
415
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and the Karzai government in Afghanistan to determine the impartial, effective
organizations from the partisan, inefficient ones. Also, the large number of
organizations in an active conflict zone made it easier for humanitarian assistance
to be used as a political and military resource.420 If one organization refused to
cooperate with a donor, there were many other organizations willing to comply
with certain restrictions. The large number of organizations made it more difficult
for MSF or the ICRC to distinguish themselves. This made it almost impossible
for aid personnel to stay on the edges of the conflict so misuse of aid was
prevalent and coordination low. As Arthur Helton, a research fellow for the
Council of Foreign Relations, killed while researching in Baghdad asked in 2003,
“how coordinated can the effort be when donors will give money through both
multilateral and bilateral channels, international organizations and NGOs will
jockey for roles and money...?”421 This competitive spirit between organizations
reduced the space for agencies to negotiate with donors and de-politicize aid.
When resources were scarce and risks high, humanitarian agencies could not
jeopardize losing support. This meant that organizations could not effectively
distinguish themselves from military humanitarianism and the UN could not
secure the capacity and autonomy to adhere to the humanitarian imperative in
Afghanistan.422
There seemed to exist a negative correlation between superpower (namely
the US in this case) involvement and the ability of humanitarian actors to
420
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principled in their response to the complex emergency.423 US strategic interests
directly clashed with humanitarian principles of impartiality and deliverance of
aid to those in most urgent need. The US-coalition did not have the same goals as
MSF, nor did they adhere to the same standards regarding quality of assistance.
Military humanitarianism was often in terms of COIN objectives, linked to
outputs rather than outcomes.424 For example, military aid counted the number of
children who were vaccinated (output) rather than the reduction in child mortality
(outcome). Much of the military humanitarianism did not meet actual civilian
needs and deserving recipients did not gain access to aid, as strategy was more
important than urgency of need.425 A lack of effective evaluation made this
problem worse, as the military provision of aid was largely unevaluated. There
was insufficient monitoring of humanitarian programs, with a trend of “spending
too much too quickly, with too little oversight in [an] insecure environment.”426
Without effective evaluation and a connected feedback loop, it was impossible to
improve these systems and improve aid provision overall.
Divergence from principles, challenges negotiating access, donor
pressures, and a lack of effective evaluation exacerbated the problems faced by
humanitarian actors in Afghanistan during the early 2000s. As a study by the
Feinstein Center at Tufts described the situation:
terrorism and efforts to counteract it had specific, discernable,
recurring - and largely negative - impacts on the humanitarian
423
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enterprise. These included increased unwillingness on the part
of belligerents to allow organizations to carry out their
assistance and protection mandates, stepped up efforts at
manipulation and control of aid institutions and personnel, and
reduced space for advocacy.427
These issues led to an increase in politicization and militarization of
humanitarianism that made Afghanistan extremely unsafe for aid workers and
reduced the effectiveness of assistance programs as a whole.

Conclusion
Afghanistan continues to be plagued by instability and a lack of
development without a clear end in sight. Instrumentalization of humanitarian aid
for political and military purposes does not work over the long-run, as such
manipulation has existed in Afghanistan since the 1980s with little positive effect.
Too many actors with competing and contradictory principles attempted to
provide relief, but all were tarnished by the US-led military provision of aid and
UN complicity. It is worth noting that in 2008, after much lobbying, the UN,
various NGOs, the NATO-led troops, and Afghan government forces agreed to a
set of “Civil-Military Guidelines” to reiterate international humanitarian
principles.428 These terms included prevention of the PRTs from providing aid
and methods to differentiate between combatants and noncombatants. Yet,
without effective mechanisms to enforce and monitor such guidelines, there has
been little improvement. As a result, targeting of humanitarians continues - for
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example, in 2015 alone, 101 aid workers in Afghanistan were the targets of major
attacks, including assault, murder, and kidnapping429 Humanitarian assistance
remains vulnerable in Afghanistan, with reduced effectiveness and continued
dwindling interest in the West to provide necessary resources. Meanwhile,
Afghans continue to suffer from conflict and a lack of social services. Ultimately,
humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan inadvertently contributed to the conflict
and principles did not prove resilient against political forces.
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Conclusion
At this “critical point of history,” with complex emergencies in countries
across the world and global displacement at a record high, it is necessary to ask
how dilemmas of competition and politicization in the humanitarian sector will
affect the outcomes of aid. As demonstrated through the case studies of postgenocide Rwanda and Afghanistan after 9/11, manipulation of humanitarian
assistance is hard to avoid and principles are often not enough to prevent cooption
or compromise. Humanitarians are constrained by their relationships with donors,
local actors, and aid recipients. This raises issues of moral hazard through
principal-agent relations, a broken feedback loop, challenges of evaluation, and
increasing competition for contracts, funds, and media attention. When
organizations are dependent on others for the funding and access that determines
their survival, compromise and complicity in behavior contrary to humanitarian
principles result. In the Great Lakes Region, humanitarians fed into regional
instability by providing aid to génocidaires in an incredibly unsafe environment.
Humanitarian principles of neutrality meant that war criminals received food
alongside innocent children and even once this was recognized, most
organizations felt unable to leave the crisis. In Afghanistan, humanitarian
assistance was coopted for military and political goals, as independence was
impossible to maintain in the midst of donor pressure and a proliferation of
agencies. How will humanitarian principles hold up against the dilemmas of
today’s emergencies? Is aid fanning the flames of crisis or helping to dampen the
fire?
126

Implications
The challenges, organizational responses, and lessons from the case
studies of this paper provide a framework for understanding aid to complex
humanitarian emergencies today and into the future. While this paper is by no
means exhaustive of the dilemmas faced by humanitarians in Syria, Yemen, and
South Sudan, it is meant to provide some context and framing through which to
think about these crises. Given that they are ongoing, it is impossible to conduct a
full analysis of organizations’ responses to the aforementioned challenges.
Understanding the current constraints faced by humanitarians is a first step to
comprehending the sheer enormity of hardship faced by aid actors abroad and
determining whether their responses will have ultimately good or bad impacts for
those they are trying to help.

Syria
After a harsh government crackdown on protesters sparked a civil war in
2011, more than 11 million Syrians have been displaced from their homes, with
4.8 million seeking refuge abroad. Within Syria, more than 13.5 million people
are desperately in need of humanitarian assistance.430 The war’s total death toll is
greater than 470,000 people.431 With dozens of rebel groups fighting, escalation
from Assad (including increased chemical attacks), Russian, American, and
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Iranian involvement, and the UN Security Council often stuck at an impasse, there
is no clear end in sight. For 2017, the UN requested more than $8 billion to
address the Syrian crisis, including aid both in the country and refugee support in
the region.432
Despite the ongoing attempts to provide aid to Syrian civilians,
humanitarian actors face dilemmas of politicization, security, and access that
compromise their ability to be principled and effective. Although a lack of
concrete information makes it challenging to know what is actually happening in
Syria, many different narratives of aid politicization have already emerged.
Access to populations in need has been a particularly acute issue. For
example, in 2015, the UN expressed frustration that Syria ignored most of its
requests to deliver aid, as only 10 percent of all requested convoy approvals were
granted.433 Then, during the ceasefire in September 2016, the UN again
complained that aid trucks were not granted access to besieged neighborhoods in
Aleppo, despite the Syrian government's agreements to such measures prior to the
ceasefire. Jan Egeland, adviser to the UN special envoy to Syria, said the UN
appeal was simple: “Can well-fed, grown men please stop putting [up] political,
bureaucratic and procedural roadblocks for brave humanitarian workers who are
willing and able to go to serve women, children, wounded civilians in besieged
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and crossfire areas?”434 Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly
complained that the UN only supplies aid to areas controlled by anti-government
rebels.435 Further, an investigation by The Guardian found that the UN has
actually awarded contracts worth millions to people closely associated with
Bashar al-Assad and his regime.436 One UN official reported that every UN
agency has at least “one person who is a direct relative of a Syrian official.”437 In
response, the UN has insisted it is impartial, but needs to work with all parties in
the conflict, and is particularly constrained by the Syrian government. Looking at
aid delivery, 64 percent of WHO medical supplies have been delivered to areas
held by or in support of Assad, and, overall, almost two-thirds of emergency
supplies from the UN have gone to government-held areas.438 As a result of such
entanglement, 73 humanitarian NGOs signed a statement suspending information
sharing with the UN due to “concern of manipulation of humanitarian relief
efforts by the political interest of the Syrian government that deprives other
Syrians in besieged areas from services.”439
While such decisions by the UN are questionable from a standpoint of
impartiality and ethics, many UN officials argue that they are necessary. For
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example, the UN broke an EU sanction against Makhlouf, which runs Syriatel, by
negotiating a telecommunications deal, but how was this avoidable when
communication is needed within the country?440 One UN spokesman said that
“when faced with having to decide whether to procure good or services from
businesses that may be affiliated with the government or let civilians go without
life-saving assistance, the choice is clear: our duty is to the civilians in need.”441
Yet, Reinoud Leenders, an expert in war studies, argues that the UN may be
worsening the situation by paying “lucrative procurement contracts to Syrian
regime cronies who are known to bankroll the very repression and brutality that
caused much of the country’s humanitarian needs.”442 Such responses to the crisis
in Syria demonstrate how the humanitarian principles of impartiality and
neutrality can clash against systemic pressures.
The major constraint for humanitarians in Syria is gaining access to needy
populations and negotiating among the various players, including the Syrian
government and rebel groups. MSF explained that it is incredibly challenging to
provide consistent, effective aid when negotiating with many actors and
navigating the various security threats.443 MSF is significantly constrained in
Syria, due to security challenges and a lack of official authorization from the
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Syrian government.444 Similarly, the ICRC has also struggled to get the
“immediate green light” for its operations in Syria.445 Many criticize the Syrian
government for its prevention of aid through bureaucratic measures, and others
still criticize the UN for not challenging the requirement of Assad’s approval for
humanitarians. Yet, Peter Maurer, president of the ICRC, defended the system as
a component of IHL despite the barriers it creates.446
Overall, with such difficulties of access and security, levels of assistance
across Syria remain inadequate. The crisis in Syria shows little sign of ending in
the near future, with every indicator that humanitarianism will continue to face
challenges of politicization, access, and security. Clearly a political solution is
required in Syria and humanitarian assistance cannot fill that need. Although it is
challenging to make a judgment on whether complicity with Assad’s government
is necessary and/or justified, if Rwanda and Afghanistan yield any lessons, it is
that “humanitarian, military, and political solutions should not - they cannot - be
dependent on one another.”447 It is likely that the more tangled these spheres
become in Syria and the more violations of humanitarian principles that ensue, the
more the Syrian people will continue to suffer. Humanitarian assistance will not
only fail to address their needs but also potentially worsen the situation.
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Yemen
In recent years, Yemen, one of the poorest Arab countries, has been
ravaged by war between government forces and allies of the Houthi rebel
movement. Foreign involvement, such as the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, has
increased the ferocity of the conflict, with more than 60 percent of civilian deaths
resulting from Saudi airstrikes.448 After two years of fighting, neither side is close
to a complete victory and meanwhile the humanitarian crisis is growing. Out of
Yemen’s population of 27 million people, 2 million are internally displaced, 17
million are food insecure, and 14.4 million lack access to clean drinking water.449
International attention to Yemen has mainly focused on the security
aspects, though UN Security Council resolutions have been largely unable to
effectively limit the conflict’s impact.450 Humanitarians struggle with securing
access to populations in need, both politically and logistically. The process of
gaining access to Yemen is bureaucratic and lengthy, often involving permit
delays or excessive restrictions.451 The process for humanitarian agencies
becomes more challenging in the midst of shifting political solutions and ceasefire
negotiations. Yet, most ceasefires are unlikely to hold, so aid agencies cannot
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expect them to allow time to deliver aid in peace.452 Additionally, port control of
Hodeidah is contentious and access is needed to get any supplies into Yemen.
Hodeidah was first targeted by the Saudis in 2015, but the Obama administration
worked to normalize the port’s operations. However, with the election of Donald
Trump, the port’s security is unclear and it may be targeted by bombings.453
Stephen Anderson, the country director for WFP in Yemen, expressed concern
about this, saying “We just want to keep this lifeline open. If we lose access...it’s
a game changer.”454 Uncertainty dominates the aid sector in Yemen. Once
supplies get into the country, road access to various cities is a large constraint, as
many groups have set up checkpoints. This is particularly challenging in cities
like Aden, where multiple groups are vying for control.455 The city of Taizz has
also suffered from blockades, as Houthis prevented UN envoys from entering.
According to Stephen O’Brien, “despite repeated attempts by UN agencies and
our humanitarian partners to negotiate access and reach people, trucks have
remained stuck at checkpoints and only very limited assistance has been allowed
in.”456 Houthis are not the only armed forces actively blocking aid; Yemeni
government forces have also prevented UN agencies and NGOs from entering
cities in Al Dhale, cutting off over 50,000 people from assistance.457 Additionally,
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all groups involved in the war have been documented confiscating aid supplies
meant for civilians by blocking roads and preventing passage.458 Such prevention
of aid movement and the overall conflict fragmentation have made negotiation of
access increasingly precarious and unpredictable.
Aid workers are operating in an incredibly unsafe environment, where
intense fighting makes it hard for many international NGOs to maintain large field
operations. Many health facilities have been targeted and abolished. For example,
between October 2015 and August 2016, four MSF hospitals were destroyed.459
Aid workers are targeted by violence generally. In particular, ambulance
hijackings are common - in 2015, seven ambulances were hijacked in just one
week, and this trend is not unusual.460 As a result of violence against aid workers,
many international NGOs and the UN have placed security restrictions on their
staff. This creates the problem of remote management, where unreliable local
partners carry out aid delivery.461 Further, violence and remote management make
evaluation of programs “a huge challenge,” according to Julien Harneis,
UNICEF’s Yemen country director.462 Thus, aid agencies do not have detailed
information about the actual needs of Yemen’s population and cannot effectively
correct any program failures. Humanitarians are also without mechanisms to
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improve the security situation or reduce violence against aid workers, given the
overall disrespect for IHL by all parties to the conflict.
Finally, Yemen suffers from a lack of international attention. The
humanitarian response is significantly below what is required. The UN has only
received $2 billion in donations, 7 percent of what it needs for 2017 operations.463
Jimmy McGoldrick, the UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen, levied
accusations that the media has not adequately informed the world about the
disaster, making it harder for humanitarian agencies to get funding.464 Yet, it is
impossible to know whether, if full funds were raised, the aid effort would be
effective. Harneis has said, “the needs are huge, so there is no way that
humanitarian organizations can cover all of them,” in the midst of the war.465
Especially with the lack of respect for IHL and humanitarian conventions, when
humanitarian actors lack “unconditional access to all parts of the country,” and
operate in the middle of violence, it is challenging to meet the needs of Yemen’s
population.

South Sudan
South Sudan, the world’s newest nation, broke away from Sudan in 2011,
but political discord within the governing party soon turned into violence along
political and ethnic lines. The UN says the humanitarian situation is

463

"UN Receives Only 7% of Humanitarian Aid Required for Yemen."
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170329-un-official-only-7-of-humanitarian-aidrequired-for-yemen/.
464
Ibid.
465
Mojalli and Cornish.
135

“catastrophic,” with 6.1 million people (more than half the population) in need of
assistance and around 4.8 million people severely food insecure.466 The situation
is more precarious due to extreme violence, including targeting of aid workers,
and various political and logistical issues of access.
Since December 2013, over 57 humanitarian aid workers have been killed
in South Sudan while others are missing or have suffered attacks, rape, and
abduction.467 An NGO badge does not prevent people from being attacked, and
violence has made it increasingly difficult for organizations to be present in local
communities. For example, the ICRC withdrew staff from the Unity State, one of
the neediest areas in South Sudan, after its compound was looted and
threatened.468 ICRC staff have also been killed in the Upper Nile region when a
hospital was attacked, and MSF has suffered similar violence in the same
regions.469 O’Brien has called for action to halt targeting of aid workers,
emphasizing that “humanitarians are here in South Sudan to save lives and for no
other reason. Our task and our demand by the UN and beyond is to impartially
meet the urgent and severe humanitarian and protection needs of the millions of
suffering people in this country.”470 However, such principles carry little weight
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in the midst of a complicated and violent conflict. Targeted attacks against aid
workers are coupled with hijacking and theft of supplies. Warehouses are
commonly looted, with everything from medical supplies to trucks to fuel to
water pumps being stolen by government forces and rebel groups alike.471 All
sides have shown a willingness to block aid and attack humanitarians. For
example, a UN helicopter containing supplies was shot down by rebels, while
government troops attacked an NGO housing compound.472 Pure logistics issues
regarding aid delivery also exist, due to poor transportation infrastructure and the
danger/difficulty of moving around large amounts of supplies.
As a result, organizations have reduced their operations or shifted them to
remote delivery. As seen through other situations where this is done, aid delivery
often deteriorates in quality and subsequently humanitarians’ relationships with
local communities also worsen. This same chain of events is occurring in South
Sudan. Joyce Luma, South Sudan country director for WFP, reported that they
“haven’t been able to access central Unity in a long, long time,” leaving at least
300,000 people inaccessible, “because of the intensification of the fighting.”473 In
order to reach people across the country, the UN and other humanitarian actors
are using helicopter drops, but these are extremely costly and at high risk for
confiscation once supplies are dropped.474 This remote delivery of aid means that
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it is nearly impossible to effectively evaluate assistance and determine how many
people are in critical need.
Another attempt to address the security-humanitarian issues in South
Sudan was the establishment of ‘Protection of Civilian’ areas by the UN Mission
in South Sudan (UNMISS) within peacekeeping bases. However, these are not
durable solutions and the necessary civil-military coordination that results has
actually caused a further breakdown in distinction between military and
humanitarian forces.475 This could have similar implications to what occurred in
Afghanistan when humanitarians were perceived as part of the military force.
Overall, the relations between the humanitarian community and the South
Sudanese government, along with other parties to the conflict, is confrontational,
and NGOs are operating in a regulatory environment that impedes operations.476
Yet, humanitarians are unable to negotiate or influence the situation, as they are
extremely fearful of losing access to people in need. These tensions also reduce
the capacity for impartial data collection, as most of the information on South
Sudan is incomplete, incorrect, or subject to politicization.477 Despite calls from
many UN representatives, including Serge Tissot, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) representative in South Sudan, saying that “immediate
intervention is absolutely imperative to save lives now...new mechanisms for
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swift clearance of humanitarian access requests must be established and fresh
funding is urgently needed,” there has been little progress.478

Final Thoughts
Humanitarian donor funding reached a record high in 2016, but only half
of the world’s humanitarian requirements were met.479 The humanitarian sector is
stretched to its limits, forced to cope with complex emergencies increasing in size
and complicatedness. Organizations are bound to donors in a constant cycle of
requesting money, while dealing with a multitude of actors to negotiate access to
conflicts. The inter-woven, ineffective, wasteful institutional mechanisms of the
aid sector are unable to negotiate the demands of complex humanitarian
emergencies. As the case studies of Rwanda and Afghanistan demonstrate, an
unwieldy system leads to competition, compromises, and complicity that
ultimately moves humanitarian assistance away from its core ethical values.
Resulting from this are suboptimal outcomes, prolonged conflicts, and dependent,
unstable regions. It certainly seems that the international community is headed
along the same path in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan today. The incredible
work of humanitarian actors in saving lives is valuable, but systemic constraints
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that clash with principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence mean that
many lives are also harmed along the way.
The next step is to ask, can we do better? Certainly there have been valiant
efforts to improve the humanitarian assistance sector, but these have been
disjointed and often just as underfunded as other aspects of aid. This paper
outlined the many challenges faced by humanitarians and the problematic
outcomes that result when principles clash with real world dilemmas. Hopefully,
it has provided some valuable takeaways for future research both on the deeper
dynamics of aid and possibilities for a better future. Reform of humanitarian
assistance must directly engage with humanitarian principles, the interconnected
and complicated relationships between involved actors, and institutional
dynamics. Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan are not the only countries facing
crises, nor will they be the last. If the international community continues to
believe in humanitarianism, then certainly it must do better.
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